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Stalled Between Seasons: The International
Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim
Period
OMAR M. DAJANI*
What god shall resurrect us
in his flesh?
After all, the iron cage is shrinking.
The hangman will not wait
though we wail from birth
in the name of these happy ruins.
What narrow yesterdays,
what stale and shriveled years..
Even storms come begging
when the sky matches the gray
of the sand,
leaving us stalled between seasons
barricadedby what we see.t
Palestine first appeared on the United Nations' agenda as a question.1 To a great extent, it remains one. The Palestinian people have
sought for much of this century to achieve national independence,
striving for international recognition of their right to determine freely
their political status in the territory they claim as their own. In the
1960s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as the international representative of the Palestinian people and, since then, has
played a central role in defining and pursuing their national aspirations. In 1993, the PLO and the government of Israel agreed to a Dec-

Law clerk to Judge Dorothy W. Nelson, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. J.D., Yale Law School, February 1997; B.A. Northwestern University, 1991. The
author would like to thank Professor Michael Reisman for his thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. The author also appreciates the support of the Schell Center
for International Human Rights and the Coca-Cola World Fund, which funded my preliminary research at the United Nations Centre for Human Rights. Finally, I gratefully
acknowledge the limitless patience and support of M.T. and Ninon Dajani.
t Ali Ahmed Said (Adonis), Elegy for the Time at Hand, in THE BLOOD OF ADONIS:
SELECTED POEMS (Samuel Hazo trans.,1971).
1. One of the United Nations General Assembly's first items of business was to create a Special Committee to examine "the question of Palestine." See G.A. Res. 104 (S-1),
U.N. Doc. A/310, at 6-7 (1947). For a thoughtful analysis of the origins and implications of
the phrase, see EDWARD SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 3-9 (1979).
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laration of Principles on Interim Self-Governing Arrangements (DOP)2
that established a framework for limited Palestinian self-government
during an interim period, pending resolution of the permanent status of
the territory occupied by Israel since 1967. Pursuant to the DOP, they
have concluded a series of agreements elaborating upon and implementing transitional arrangements. The parties, however, have yet to
agree on either from what or to what they are making a transition.
Upon taking power, the Likud Government of Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu issued guidelines declaring that it "would oppose
the establishment of a Palestinian state or any foreign sovereignty west
of the Jordan River." 3 In contrast, a member of the Palestinian leadership has asserted that "[t]here will be neither peace nor security without an independent Palestinian state .... ,,4
This disagreement regarding what Palestine will be prompts consideration of what Palestine is. In one of its few references to the future, the DOP states that elections for the Palestinian Council established to administer portions of the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPT) during the interim period are to constitute "... a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people and their just requirements."5 This declaration
raises a number of important questions; foremost, what is the nature of
"the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people"? Is the right to selfdetermination among them? If so, to what extent are the interim arrangements a "significant.. . preparatory step" toward their realization? And how do the interim arrangements - particularly the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PA) affect the status of existing Palestinian public bodies in the international system?
In this essay, I undertake to answer these questions. I begin in
Part One by reviewing the Palestinian claim to self-determination, outlining international legal treatment of the principle, and evaluating its
applicability to the people and territory of Palestine. Next, in Part Two,
I examine the Palestinian public bodies established in pursuit of Palestinian national rights by analyzing the structure and legal status of the
PLO, the "State" of Palestine established by the Palestine National
Council in 1988, and the PA created by the DOP and subsequent
agreements. Finally, in Part Three, I try to define the legal status of
Palestine as it is presently constituted, and to evaluate the extent to

2. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1528 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
3. The New Government's Guidelines, JERUSALEM POST, June 18, 1996, at 3.
4. Adviser to Yasser Arafat rejects Puerto Rico-like Palestine, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Nov. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12177831.
5. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2, art. 3, para. 3. The same language appears in the Interim Agreement concluded by the parties in 1995. See also The IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, art. 2, para. 2,
(September 28, 1995) <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.i/peace/interim.html> [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
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which it fulfills the legal requirements for the exercise of selfdetermination.
I. THE PALESTINIAN CLAIM TO SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of self-determination is the legal foundation on which
the Palestinian people's struggle for national independence is based. In
international practice, however, the principle of self-determination becomes a right only when invoked under certain circumstances, with the
status of both the population and the territory concerned determining
the viability of the exercise of self-determination. As will be seen, the
Palestinians have attained broad international recognition of their right
to self-determination in the OPT. Moreover, as I argue below, the territory they claim constitutes a viable self-determination unit.
A. The Principleof Self-Determination
Self-determination has come to elicit broad recognition as an international human right. 6 The United Nations Charter states explicitly
that "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination"
7
should form the basis for relations among nations in the world system
and provides implicitly for its vindication in its provisions regarding the
disposition of trusteeships and non-self-governing territories.8 The
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations), moreover, characterizes the principle as a
right, proclaiming that "by virtue of the principle of... selfdetermination of peoples all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status." 9 Similarly, both
6. For a thorough analysis of the historical development of the principle of selfdetermination, See Goyora Binder, The Kaplan Lecture on Human Rights: The Case for
Self-Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223, 223-48 (1993); John Collins, Note, SelfDeterminationin InternationalLaw: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137,
138-143 (1980); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination,65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; See also art. 55.
8. See M.C. Baussiouni, "Self-Determination"and the Palestinians, 65 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 31, 32 (1971) (arguing that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the U.N. Charter
embody the principle of self-determination "in spirit"); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 356 (1979) (stating that Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter is an attempt to apply "somewhat similar ideas to those embodied in Article 22 of the
[League of Nations] Covenant to a far broader category of territory.").
9. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). The Resolution was passed unanimously by the General Assembly and "is generally viewed as an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter." Binder, supra note 6,
at 236. Binder argues:
The Declaration was the culmination of a lengthy effort to legitimate the U.N. Charter for
its newer signatories in the developing world who took no part in its drafting. The Declaration was drafted by a committee appointed to develop an official interpretation on which
the new as well as the old members could agree.
The internal evidence of the Declaration's authoritative character includes:
(a) the resolution's self-description as a 'Declaration' in its title; (b) the resolution's 'declaration' that 'the principles of the Charter which are embodied
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights affirm that "all peoples"
have a right to self-determination, and that "[b]y virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."1 0 By the express terms of
these international instruments, self-determination has been elevated
to the status of a right.
The scope and legal force of the right, however, have varied in application. As Professor Cherif Bassiouni has suggested:
'Self-determination' is a catch-all concept which exists as a principle,
develops into a right under certain circumstances, unfolds as a process
and results in a remedy. As an abstract principle it can be enunciated
without reference to a specific context; as a right it is operative only in
a relative context, and as a remedy, its equitable application is limited
by the rights of others and the potential injuries it may inflict as
weighed against the potential benefits it may generate.1"
Central among the equitable concerns to which Professor Bassiouni
alludes has been regard for the sovereignty of states. Because "peoples"
can be defined broadly or narrowly, the right of self-determination can
be construed to bestow national rights upon almost any minority group,
with potentially destructive consequences for the internal stability and
territorial integrity of States. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, States generally have proven hesitant to interpret the right to self-determination

in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law[;] (c) the
reference in the resolution's title to U.N. Charter article 1 ('Friendly Relations') and in its first paragraph to the 'Principles' of the United Nations
listed in U.N. Charter article 2; (d) the observation in the Declaration's pmbl.
that 'progressive development and codification' of those principles would
'promote the realization of the purposes of the United Nations[;]' and (e) the
implicit reference to U.N. Charter article 13, conferring on the General Assembly authority to 'encourage the progressive development of international
law and its codification.'
The external evidence for the authority of the Declaration would include the
Declaration's adoption by consensus, combined with two customary canons of
construction. The first is that in treaty interpretation, 'There shall be taken
into account, together with the context any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions,' and 'any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.'
The second is the custom of reading constitutional texts as necessarily conferring on the institutions they establish authority to 'interpret their own
constitutional powers and the specific provisions of the text so constituting
them.
Id. at 236 n.52 (citations omitted).
10. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, came into force
on January 3, 1976, part I, art.1, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, came into force on March 23, 1976, part I, art. 1, para. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173.
11. Baussiouni, supranote 8, at 33.
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as conveying the right to secession from a sovereign State. 12 Accordingly, the Declaration on Friendly Relations makes clear that it does
not "authoriz[e] or encourag[e] any action which would dismember or
impair the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of self-determination of peoples." 13 Self-determination, therefore, has
not been accepted to be the unqualified right of all peoples.
Indeed, notwithstanding Judge's Dillard's assertion in the Western
Sahara Case that "[i]t is for the people to determine the destiny of the
territory and not the territory the destiny of the people,"'14 the status of
a territory has proven significant in determining whether and how a
given people will exercise self-determination. As noted above, States
generally have been unwilling to recognize that a right of selfdetermination extends to peoples residing within the borders of an existing State if the exercise of that right would compromise the sovereignty or territorial integrity of that State. In these situations, State
practice has been to regard self-determination as a principle, rather
than as a right. As Crawford concludes, "[Self-determination] is not a
right applicable directly to any group of people desiring political independence or self-government. Like sovereignty, it is a legal principle.
It applies as a matter of right only after the unit of self-determination
has been determined by the application of appropriate rules."15 The
question, then, is how to determine what constitutes a "selfdetermination unit."
The archetypal self-determination units are former mandated territories and colonies. The U.N. Charter places dependent territories into
two categories: trusteeships and non-self-governing territories. 16 The
principle of self-determination was a basic premise of the Charter's provisions regarding the disposition of trusteeships,17 and it was gradually
accepted to be relevant to the administration and disposition of other
non-self-governing territories as well. In its 1971 Namibia Opinion, the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) determined that State practice, as

12. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 265 (describing broad non-recognition of Biafra after
secession from Nigeria); Emerson, supra note 6, at 464-65 (citing the United Nations unwillingness to support Katanga's secession from the Congo). See also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV),
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) ("Any attempt
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.").
13. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 9.
14. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 122 (Oct. 16, 1975) (separate opinion of J. Dillard).
15. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 101.

16. See U.N. CHARTER, chs. 11-13.
17. Article 76 of the Charter states that one of the purposes of the trusteeship system
is the "progressive development [of the inhabitants of trust territories] towards selfgovernment or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned..."
U.N CHARTER, art. 76; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 92 (referring to mandated
and trust territories as "the primary type of self-determination territory).
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reflected in the General Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and in
"the political history of mandated territories in general," indicated that
international law had come to require application of the principle of
self-determination to all non-self-governing territories that had been
under colonial regimes. 18 This view was affirmed by the I.C.J. in the
Western Sahara Case.19
The history of decolonization consequently provides some basis for
identifying non-self-governing territories whose peoples are entitled to
self-determination. Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter offers only vague
guidance for determining which territories and or peoples qualify, referring simply to "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government." 20 As Crawford states, "[t]he meaning of
these terms is not self-evident and has not been entirely settled by subsequent practice." 21 He notes that Article 74 of the Charter makes a
distinction between non-self-governing territories and the "metropolitan
areas" of existing States, suggesting that "the problem of minorities not
inhabiting a clearly defined territory but scattered throughout a State"
therefore falls outside of the scope of Chapter XI.22 The result is that
one must consequently determine how to distinguish between non-selfgoverning territories within and outside a metropolitan State.
In 1959, the General Assembly established a committee to examine
the obligations imposed by Chapter XI upon administering States. 23 On
the basis of its report, the Assembly passed Resolution 1541 (XV), which
sets out "principles which should guide members in determining
whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called
for under Article 73(e) of the Charter."24 Principle IV of the Resolution
states, "[p]rimafacie there is an obligation to transmit information in
respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it."25 Once
this prima facie case is established, other factors could then inform the
evaluation of whether a territory is non-self-governing under Chapter
XI of the Charter; the central issue being whether those factors "affect
the relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a position or
status of subordination."' 26 A territory therefore falls under the ambit of
the Charter's provisions regarding non-self-governing territories if it is
separate from, distinct from, and subordinate to a metropolitan State.
In sum, the principle of self-determination becomes a legal right
18. 1971 I.C.J. 6, 31.
19. 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-3.
20.
21.
22.
23.

U.N. Charter, art. 73.
CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 359.
Id. (discussing the U.N. CHARTER art. 74).
See GOODRICH, HAMBRO, & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 461-62 (1969).

24. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 12.
25. Id. Annex, Principle 4.
26. Id. Annex, Principle 5.
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only when it is invoked by a group recognized to constitute a people and
with regard to a territory that can serve as a self-determination unit.
As I will show, Palestine meets both of these criteria.
B. The PalestinianPeople
Juridical recognition of the Palestinian people by the international
community has expanded in accordance with the development of more
inclusive conceptions of participation in the international process and
with the Palestinians' evolving conception of national identity. The
Palestinians, initially, were defined by what they were not: in 1922, a
nascent League of Nations identified them simply as the "existing nonJewish communities in Palestine." By the end of the 1960s, however,
the United Nations General Assembly recognized the Palestinians to be
a people and attributed to them the attendant rights to selfdetermination and sovereignty. This section traces international recognition of the Palestinian people as it has developed over the course of
this century.
1. 1919-1947: The Arab Inhabitants of Palestine
The states that structured the international order at the conclusion
of the first World War provisionally recognized Palestine to be an independent nation. The League of Nations Covenant [hereinafter Cove27
nant], signed in 1919 in conjunction with the Treaty of Versailles,
marked an initial, though perhaps reluctant, departure from the statefocused vision of the international community that prevailed during the
nineteenth century. 28 Reflecting the Great Powers' acquiescence to
President Woodrow Wilson's advocacy in favor of the principle of selfdetermination, 29 the Covenant acknowledged the existence of "peoples
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of
the modern world" and declared that their "well-being and develop-

27. One historian has suggested that "neither the Europeans nor the Americans could
have the peace treaty without the League or the League without the peace treaty; both
would stand or fall together...." F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE

AND TIMES, 1920-1946, at 39 (1986).
28. During the nineteenth century, the European Concert maintained a state-focused
vision of international participation, recognizing the legal status only of nations that had
been incorporated into recognized states. The "society of nations," as then defined, might
more accurately have been characterized as a society of states. Binder, supra note 6, at
227.
29. Binder, supra note 6, at 228, Scholars disagree about the extent to which the
Covenant implies or incorporates the principle of self-determination. Cf. L.C. Green, SelfDeterminationand Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 65 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 40,
42, 56 (1971) (arguing that Article 22 of the League of Nations is not a recognition of the
right to self determination); John A. Collins, Note, Self-Deter-mination in International
Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 158 (1981) (arguing that the
Covenant implicitly recognizes the right to self-determination); Rupert Emerson, SelfDetermination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 463 (1971) (making no reference to the Covenant,
but stating that the right of self-determination advocated by Wilson applied to peoples of
the Middle East).
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ment" formed "a sacred trust of civilization. ' 30 In accordance with this
vision, the Covenant delegated responsibility for carrying out this trust
to certain "advanced nations" under whose tutelage the designated
Mandates presumably could progress. 31 Palestine, along with the other
communities formerly under the sovereignty of the Turkish (Ottoman)
Empire, was categorized as developed enough to warrant "provisional"
recognition, "subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as [it was] able to stand alone."
32 The Covenant, therefore, bestowed a level of international recognition upon the "nation" of Palestine with the expectation that it shortly
would achieve statehood.
Article 22 of the Covenant, which established the framework for the
mandates system, appears to define this "nation" in primarily communal terms. Its provision regarding the "A" Mandates, as Palestine and
the other former Turkish provinces would later be known, states that
"[c]ertain communities.., have reached a stage of development where
their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized... ."33 The Covenant committed, moreover, to giving prime consideration to the wishes of these "communities" in the selection of the
Mandatory. 34 These provisions seem to reflect an acknowledgment that
the peoples in this category were more than simply the inhabitants of
defined territories, that they were coherent communities that were politically organized enough to articulate preferences regarding their national development. The communal focus of the "A" Mandates provision
becomes even more apparent when contrasted with the more territorial
definitions of the "B" and "C" Mandates. The "B" Mandates provision
makes reference to "peoples," rather than "communities," and makes
"the administration of the territory" - not the rendering of administrative advice - the Mandatory's prime responsibility. 35 Moreover, while
the "A" Mandates provision makes no reference at all to territory, the
Covenant defines the "C" Mandates in entirely territorial terms, making only incidental reference to their "population."36 The Covenant appears, therefore, to do more than recognize Palestine as a territory; it
37
recognizes the Palestinians as a nation.
The terms of the Mandate for Palestine, which was approved by the
League of Nations Council on July 24, 1922, departed in a number of
respects from Article 22(4) of the Covenant, shifting significantly away
from recognition of a Palestinian national community. As an initial
matter, the League of Nations Council ignored the Covenant's requirement that the wishes of the indigenous community be a prime criterion
30. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, para. 1.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. art. 22,
Id. art. 22,
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 22,
Id. art. 22,

para. 2.
para. 4 (emphasis added).

para. 5.
para. 6.

37. See W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986) 189-90.
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in the selection of the Mandatory, assigning the Mandate to Great Britain without the consent of Palestine's population.38 The Mandate,
moreover, entrusted to Great Britain "the administration of the territory of Palestine,"39 words more reminiscent of the role assigned to "B"
Mandatories than of the "A" Mandatories. Most significantly, in contrast to its numerous explicit commitments to the establishment of a
"Jewish national home" in Palestine, 40 the Mandate referred to the indigenous Arab population of the country, which in 1922 represented
almost 90% of Palestine's total population, 41 primarily in contradistinction to the Jewish population. 42 The Mandate, therefore, transformed
the "independent nation" provisionally recognized by the Covenant into
an assortment of "non-Jewish communities" that happened to reside
within the borders of the territory of Palestine.
Some have argued that this conception of the Palestinians simply
conforms to the historical record - that the Arabs in Palestine in 1917
were an undifferentiated segment of the larger Arab nation that
stretched from Syria to Morocco and that they possessed no independent communal identity that could form the basis for nationhood. 43 According to this view, the national aspirations of Arabs in Palestine were
given adequate means of fulfillment by the allocation to "the Arabs" of
44
the vast tracts of land that presently comprise the Arab states.
Moreover, it has been suggested that the kingdom of Transjordan,
which in 1922 was established as an independent principality, was, itself, a "Palestinian Arab State" and consequently fulfilled whatever in45
terests in self-determination Palestinians legitimately could claim.

38. NORTHEDGE, supra note 26, at 205.
39. Mandate for Palestine, Pmbl., in 44 Stat. 2184 (1924).
40. Id. (incorporating Balfour Declaration, expressing support for "...establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,..."; recognizing Jewish grounds for
"reconstituting their national home in" Palestine); Id. at art.2, 2185 ("The Mandatory
shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home. . . I"; Id.
at art.4 (setting terms for creation of Jewish agency ". . .to assist and take part in the development of the country" and recognizing the Zionist organization in that capacity); Id.
at art.6 (committing to facilitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine); Id. at art.7, 2186
(committing to acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews).
41. See WALID KHALIDI, BEFORE THEIR DIASPORA 86 (1984).
42. Mandate for Palestine, supra note 38, at 2184, (committing not to take steps that
"might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities. ...');
Id. at art.2 ("The Mandatory shall be responsible for... [helping to establish the Jewish
national home] ... and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of
race and religion."); Id. art. 3 (qualifying commitment to Jewish immigration to ensure
"that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced"); Id. at
art.9 (guaranteeing "[riespect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests...").
43. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 10-15 (1981).
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. Id. at 22-25. Stone's position rests on the following premises: (1) that the designation "Palestine" referred historically to the territory on both sides of the Jordan River,
id. at 22; (2) that the division of the territory into the mandates of Palestine and
Transjordan represented "a last-minute encroachment on the already small allocation to

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:1

While it seems clear that Palestinian national identity at the beginning of the century was intertwined to a significant extent with a
more general Arab identity, 46 it does not follow that the establishment
of other Arab states negates the Palestinians' right to selfdetermination in Palestine. Had a different chain of events placed the
entire territory of Palestine under, for instance, the rule of Jordan's
King Abdallah, Palestinians may have had some difficulty establishing
that the principle of self-determination mandated their independence
from Jordan, since the Palestinians and Jordanians, as Arab peoples,
have long been connected by history and culture and were not always
clearly separated by national borders.
The notion that the selfdetermination rights of the people of Jaffa or Ramallah or Jerusalem
were amply satisfied by the establishment of an independent state fifty
or one hundred miles away and that their cities and land consequently
could be "allocated" to a largely foreign 47 population is, however, difficult to square with authoritative interpretations of the principle of self48
determination.
Moreover, as indifferent to the political rights of the indigenous
Palestinians as the Mandate for Palestine appears to have been, it was

the Jewish nation in the self-determination distribution .. " id. at 23; (3) that the population of Jordan is, at present, comprised largely of Palestinians, most of whom possess
Jordanian citizenship; and (4) that Jordanians and Palestinians share a historical and
cultural "affinity," id. at 24.
The historical accuracy of Stone's assertions is worthy of some skepticism. See, e.g.
ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 318 (1991) (referring to Transjordan
as land east of Palestine and noting that Britain acknowledged no Jewish claim to it);
KHALDI, supra note 42, at 27-29 (reviewing historical references to Palestine as land west
of the Jordan River); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, PalestinianCulture and Israel'sPolicy, ARAB
STUDIES Q., Spring/Summer 1985, at 95, 97-99 (discussing distinguishing characteristics
of Palestinian culture).
46. To concede this point is not to suggest that the Arabs in Palestine were culturally
indistinguishable from other Arab peoples at the beginning of the twentieth century. The
urban and agricultural lifestyles and traditions of Palestinians made them very different
from the predominantly Bedouin population of Transjordan. See ARTHUR GOLDSHMIDT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 272-73 (3d ed. 1988); See generally Abu-Lughod,
supra note 66, at 95,97-99 (discussing distinguishing characteristics of Palestinian culture).
47. Ninety percent of the Jewish population of Palestine in 1946 had immigrated to
the country in the previous four decades.
See HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1977). Most Jewish immigrants came from Central Europe, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Id.
48. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, which is generally seen as an authoritative
interpretation of the U.N. Charter's self-determination provisions, see supra note 10, and
accompanying text, states that "by virtue of the principle of... self-determination of peoples. . . all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status," Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 9, at 123. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the people of Palestine were merely a part of the larger "Arab people" in 1922, it is difficult not to see the "allocation" of their territory by foreign powers to
a foreign population as "external interference."
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not designed to facilitate placing the indigenous Arab 49 population of
Palestine under the sovereignty of a "Jewish State." The Mandate, like
the Balfour Declaration from which its language is drawn, commits to
the establishment only of a Jewish national home in Palestine.5 0 The
Balfour Declaration was adopted by the British War Cabinet only after
it received Zionist assurances that they did not seek to establish a
"Jewish Republic or other form of State in Palestine or any part of Palestine."5 1 Moreover, Great Britain refused to interpret the language of
the Balfour Declaration as contemplating the transformation of Pales52
tine into a Jewish State.
The framers of the Mandate seem to have envisioned the eventual
establishment of a single state in Palestine. For instance, although the
Mandate committed in several capacities to helping to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home, it provided for the enactment of a
single nationality law for the country, stating that the law should include "provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian
citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine."53 This provision acknowledged the concept of Palestinian nationality and framed it in non-communal (i.e. not Jewish or Arab) terms.
Similarly, the Mandate stated that "It]he Administration of Palestine
shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the
community in connection with the development of the country"54 and
expressed Britain's commitment to support "the development of selfgoverning institutions" in Palestine.5 5 The broad non-exclusive language of these provisions suggests that the framers of the Mandate conceived of Palestine as a single country whose inhabitants would possess
a single nationality and would govern themselves with a single administration. Although inter-communal strife prompted Britain to reconsider this approach, it seems clear that the eventual establishment of a
single state of Palestine was Britain's original intention. 56
Despite these apparent intentions, Britain's policies over the course
of the Mandate contributed to the development of severe intercommunal tension in Palestine. The British Mandatory Government's
commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and
its initially liberal Jewish immigration policies, aroused the resentment
49. The term "Arab" is used loosely here to include the entire indigenous population
of the country, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews.
50. Mandate for Palestine, supra note 39, at 2184; See John A. Collins, SelfDetermination in InternationalLaw; The Palestinians,12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137,
157 (1980).
51. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 37, at 38.
52 CATTAN, supra note 47.
53. Mandate for Palestine, supra note 39, art. 7, at 2186 (emphasis added).
54. Id. art. 11, at 2186 (emphasis added).
55. Id. art. 2, at 2185.
56. This textual analysis is supported by the expressed statements of British officials
at several points during the Mandate. See BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, THE BRITISH IN
PALESTINE: THE MANDATORY GOVERNMENT AND THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT, 1917-1929,
at 109 (1978); NORTHEDGE, supra note 27, at 214. See generally W. THOMAS MALLISON,
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: AN APPRAISAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973).
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of indigenous Palestinians who identified themselves as part of a
broader Arab nation and feared being placed under the rule of European immigrants. 57 These tensions generated increasingly violent inter-communal strife in Palestine and led the British Peel Commission to
conclude in 1937 that "[a]n irrepressible conflict has arisen between two
national communities within the bounds of one small country."58 Based
on these observations, the Commission recommended the partition of
Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, the latter to be incorporated into
Transjordan. The proposal raised the ire of both the Zionists, who felt
that the territory allocated to them was too small, and the Arab Palestinians, who challenged Britain's right to partition their territory at
all.5 9 Although Britain eventually abandoned this proposal declaring
its goal to be "the establishment within ten years of an independent
Palestine State,"' 60 Arab-Jewish relations continued to deteriorate.
In February 1947, Great Britain formally acknowledged that it
lacked the power to impose a settlement in Palestine and returned the
Mandate to the United Nations, which assumed responsibility for
League of Nations trusteeships. After accepting the return of the Mandate in May, the United Nations established a committee composed of
delegates from eleven United Nations member states to evaluate the
situation in Palestine and make recommendations regarding the future
of the territory. In August, a majority of the Committee recommended
a partition plan that divided Palestine into three territories - an Arab
state, a Jewish state, and an internationally administered enclave
around Jerusalem - in a contorted geographical arrangement that one
British scholar has described as "two fighting serpents entwined in an
inimical embrace." 61 The Partition Plan stated that "[i]ndependent
Arab and Jewish States... shall come into existence in Palestine two

57. Christians and Muslims in Palestine began to unite during the early part of the
1900's in opposition to Zionist national aspirations. For instance, after Zionists held a
procession in Jerusalem in November 1918 to celebrate the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, a deputation of Christian and Muslim sects, headed by the mayor of Jerusalem, submitted a written protest to the British Military Governor of Palestine articulating its concern that the Zionists would be given sovereignty over them. Responding
to Zionist assertions that Palestine had become their national home, the deputation
stated:
If it is meant that they should obtain national liberty in the country, why
should this be confined to the Jews and not to others?... We Arabs, Muslim
and Christian, have always sympathized profoundly with the persecuted
Jews in their misfortunes in other countries.... We hoped for their deliverance and prosperity. But there is a wide difference between this sympathy
and the acceptance of such a nation in our country, to be made by them a national home, ruling over us and disposing of our affairs.
WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 32.
See also JAMAL R. NAssAR, THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION
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INDEPENDENCE 9 (1991) (quoting an editorial from the Jerusalem daily demanding "selfrule," "unity of territory" and "rejection of a Zionist immigration" in Palestine).
58. MARK TESSLER, A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 241-42 (1994).

59. Id. at 242.
60. Id. at 245 (quoting a White Paper issued by Malcolm MacDonald in May 1939).
61. Id. at 259 (quoting George Kirk).
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months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory
Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October
1948."62 It then set forth an outline for a multi-phased transition period
during which each of the States was to develop provisional governmental institutions, 63 and conditioned international recognition of each
State upon its establishment of effective independence and its declared
commitment to guarantee the protection of religious sites and minority
64
rights.
The Plan, however, never came into effect. Although, after some
initial hesitation, the Zionists declared their willingness to accept the
recommendations, the Palestinian Arabs rejected them out of hand, arguing that the United Nations had no right to allocate the majority of
their territory to the Zionists (who, in March 1947, claimed possession
of less than seven percent of the land in Palestine and ownership of only
5.66%65 and represented less than a third of the territory's population). 66 The United Nations General Assembly nevertheless endorsed
the partition resolution on November 29, 1947 by a vote of thirty-three
to thirteen, with ten abstentions. 67 Almost immediately thereafter, fullscale war broke out between the Arabs and the Zionists. On May 14,
1948, after establishing control over all of the territory allocated to the
Jewish state (and over some allocated to the Arab state),68 a provisional
Zionist national council announced the establishment of the State of Israel on the portion of Palestine allocated by the Partition Plan to form
the .Jewish State. Israel captured more territory allocated to the Arab
state in fighting after its independence. By the time armistice agreements were concluded in 1949, its official boundaries encompassed al69
most 80% of the territory of Palestine.
In light of these circumstances, the effect of United Nations Resolution 181 (which recommended implementation of the Partition Plan) on
the international legal status of Palestine's indigenous inhabitants remains unclear. 70 Although the Partition Plan required each of the proposed States to make a declaration that included a commitment to
guarantee the political 71 and religious 72 rights of all Palestinians (Arab

62. Planof Participationwith Economic Union, G.A. Res. 181 (II), part 1, sec. A, para.

3, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 133 (1947).
63. Id. part 1, sec. B., at 133.
64. Id. part 1, sec. F., at 142.
65. CATTAN, supra note 47, at 88 (citing United Nations statistics); KHALIDI, supra
note 41, at 236.
66. See ABu LUGHOD, THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE 155 (1973).

67. TESSLER, supra note 58, at 261.
68. Id. at 263.
69. CATTAN, supra note 47, at 24.
70. A discussion of the legitimacy of the United Nations' decision to endorse the Partition Plan falls beyond the scope of this essay. For a critical evaluation of the legal dimensions of this issue, see CATTAN, supra note 47, at 75-89.
71. G.A. Res. 181 (I), supra note 62, part 1, sec. C, ch. 3, para. 1 ("Palestinian citizens shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which
they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.").
72. Id. at part 1, sec. C, ch. 2 (defining religious and minority rights).
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and Jewish), it defined the two states in clearly communal terms. For
instance, it provided for voluntary population transfers between the two
states and prohibited Arabs and Jews residing within the proposed territory of their own respective states from seeking citizenship in the
other state.7 3 These provisions show that the United Nations acknowledged the existence of two national communities in Palestine, each on
the verge of achieving the status of statehood. Accordingly, they reflect
a tacit recognition by the United Nations of the Palestinian Arab nation.
Over the course of the Mandate, therefore, the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine received implicit international recognition as a people
entitled to statehood. This recognition is apparent from the terms of
the League of Nations Covenant, which granted provisional recognition
of the independent nationhood of the communities designated as "A"
Mandates. While the terms of the Mandate for Palestine departed significantly from this conception of the Palestinian Arabs, defining Palestine in primarily territorial terms, U.N. Resolution 181 and the Partition Plan affirmed that the Palestinian Arabs were entitled to a State of
their own.
2. 1948-1969: From Inhabitants to Refugees
Following the establishment of the State of Israel, the international
community began to regard Palestinians in individual rather than
communal terms. 74 Although the Partition Plan had provided for voluntary population transfers between the proposed Jewish and Arab
states, 75 United Nations resolutions following the creation of the State
of Israel maintained a territorial focus. The U.N. sought to restore the
former inhabitants of Palestine to their homes, whether they were located within the newly-created State of Israel or in what remained of
the lands allocated by the Partition Plan to the Arab state. 76 The Palestine Arabs, therefore, were viewed simply as individual refugees, the
former inhabitants of the territory of Palestine. 77 This approach continued beyond the June 1967 War. 78
This shift away from international recognition of Palestinian Arab
nationhood likely resulted, at least in part, from changes in the conception of self-determination. One writer has suggested recently that the
West's reaction against nationalism after World War II - driven both

73. Id. at part 1, sec. C, ch. 3, para. 1.
74. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 37, at 189-90.
75. G.A. Res. 181 (11), supra note 62, part 1, sec. C, ch. 3, para. 1.
76. G.A. Res. 194 (III), para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 21, 24 (1948). Similarly, the
U.N. created in 1948 a relief agency-UNRWA-to provide assistance to "Palestine Refugees," not Palestinian refugees, reflecting a view of them as the inhabitants of the territory of Palestine rather than as an independent people.
77. S.C. Res. 89, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/1907 (1950).
78. Security Council Resolution 259 refers to "the inhabitants of the Arab territories
under military occupation by Israel." U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968).
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by horror at Nazi atrocities and by increasing economic and political internationalization - translated into a renunciation by Western nations
of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination and a reaffirmation of
the principle of state sovereignty.7 9 Although the United Nations Charter commits the United Nations to the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples,"80 to the postwar framers of the
United Nations Charter, "[s]elf-determination was [still] ... only.., a
means of furthering the development of friendly relations among states
and... strengthen[ing] universal peace... with the obvious consequence that it might and indeed should be set aside when its fulfillment
would give rise to tension and conflict among states."8 1 Support for Palestinian nationhood was not easily reconciled with this new vision of
self-determination. The Palestinian Arabs, as individuals, were entitled either to repatriation or to compensation for their lost possessions.
They could seek vindication of their individual rights within existing
state structures. Their claims to nationhood and to the right to establish an independent state, however, were subordinated to the maintenance of the political order established in the Middle East following the
82
Arab-Israeli War.
3. 1969-Present: Peoplehood, Participation, & Self-Determination
In the late 1960s, however, a culmination of factors8 3 brought the
United Nations General Assembly to reaffirm the recognition of Palestinian nationhood articulated in the League of Nations Covenant and
the 1947 Partition Plan. Beginning in 1969, the General Assembly
passed a series of resolutions recognizing: (1) the Palestinians' status as
a people; (2) the centrality of their participation to the achievement of a
just resolution of the Palestine question; and (3) their right to selfdetermination. This recognition, however, was not extended by all
Member States. Until 1993, Israel and the United States refused to
recognize the Palestinians' peoplehood or their right to participation in
the Middle East peace process, and both countries continue to refrain
from expressly acknowledging the Palestinians' right to self79. Binder, supra note 6, at 230-31.
80. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.

81. Binder, supra note 6, at 230-31 (quoting Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE HELSINKI

ACCORD 83, 94 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977)); Cf. GOODRICH, ET. AL, supra note 23, at
30-31 (discussing U.N. Charter framers' varying interpretations of right to selfdetermination).
82. See TESSLER, supra note 58, at 275-279 (discussing subordination of Palestinian
national aspirations to Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian political concerns); William J.
O'Brien, The PLO in InternationalLaw, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 349, 352 (1984) (identifying the
Arab States' failure to take Palestinians seriously as a factor motivating the establishment of the PLO in 1964).
83. Among these factors were the recent independence and participation of former
colonial territories in the General Assembly; Israel's occupation of the remaining territory
of Palestine following the June 1967 War; and the wresting of control over the PLO from
the Arab States by Palestinian fedayeen.
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determination. As discussed below, however, the actions of Israel and
the United States, in this regard, have been at odds with the broad recognition of Palestinian national aspirations by other members of the international community.
The General Assembly departed from its previous focus on the individual rights to repatriation and compensation of refugees from Palestine in 1969, recognizing the Palestinians' status as a people. In
resolution 2535, the General Assembly reaffirmed "the inalienable
rights of the people of Palestine,"'8 4 stating that the Palestinian refugee
problem had arisen from a denial of the Palestine Arabs' rights under
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.8 5 It, thereby, acknowledged that the Palestinians were more
than stateless individuals and that their statelessness had resulted
from a denial of their right to constitute themselves as a national community. This recognition of Palestinian peoplehood has been reaffirmed
by all subsequent General Assembly resolutions dealing with the subject.8 6 Accordingly, during its 1970 session, the General Assembly began to use the designation "the Palestinians, ' 87 instead of referring to
them as the Palestine Arabs, the Palestine refugees, or the (former) inhabitants of Palestine.
In addition to extending international recognition to the Palestinian people, the General Assembly began, during this period, to regard
them as primary participants in the settlement of the Palestine question. Previously, U.N. resolutions acknowledged no role at all for the
Palestinians. Security Council Resolution 242, for instance, made no
specific reference to the Palestinians except insofar as it affirmed the
necessity of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." 88
While Resolution 242 emphasized "the need to work for a just and lasting peace," it defined this peace as being one in which "every State in
the area can live in security."89 Maintaining the focus on the inviolability of state sovereignty apparent in the U.N. resolutions following the
1947 Arab-Israeli War, it made no reference to a Palestinian role in the
peace process or to Palestinian national rights. In contrast, General
Assembly Resolution 2628 (XXV), passed during the 1970 session, recognized the vindication of Palestinian rights to be "an indispensable
84. G.A. Res. 2535 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969).
85. Id. sec. B, pmbl..
86. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 37, at 190.
87. G.A. Res. 2628 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
88. S.C. Res. 242 U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967). U.N.
Resolution 242 deals with the Palestinians in two ways: (1) it states that the U.N. Charter
requires "the establishment of a just and lasting peace" based in part on "[w]ithdrawal of
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"; and (2) it affirms the
necessity of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Id. In light of resolutions throughout the 1960s, the phrase "just settlement of the refugee problem" likely alludes to General Assembly Resolution 194(111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 24 (1948), which demanded the repatriation or compensation of refugees.
89. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 88.
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element for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East."90 Building upon that premise, the General Assembly resolved in
1974 that "the Palestinian people is a principal party to the question of
Palestine" and invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in plenary meetings of the General Assembly concerning Palestine. 91 In a subsequent resolution, moreover, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary General "establish contacts with the
Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine."92 The General Assembly, therefore, affirmed that the
vindication of the rights of the Palestinian people was a central component of any just resolution of the Palestine question and that, accordingly, the Palestinian people had a right to participate in the settlement
of that question.
In a series of resolutions during the same period, the General Assembly made explicit that this right to participation emerged from the
Palestinians' right to self-determination. General Assembly Resolution
2649 - entitled Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Selfdetermination and Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples - condemned "those Governments that deny the right
to self-determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine."93 Through this
and subsequent resolutions, 94 the General Assembly recognized the legitimacy of the Palestinian national liberation movement and analogized it to other efforts to eradicate the vestiges of colonialism.
This recognition, however, has not been unanimous. While the existence of a Palestinian people and their right to participate in the
resolution of the Palestine question appear no longer to be in contention, their right to self-determination has not been fully recognized by
the two States, Israel and the United States, that are most able to prevent its realization. In September 1993, in anticipation of the signing of
the DOP, Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wrote to PLO Chairman

90. G.A. Res. 2628 (XXV), supra note 87.
91. G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
92. G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (emphasis added). The international role and status of the Palestine Liberation
Organization is discussed in greater depth below. See infra Section II(A).
93. G.A. Res. 2649 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 73-74, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
94. See G.A. Res. 2672 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at 35-36, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) (recognizing "that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and selfdetermination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations"); G.A. Res. 2787
(XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 82, U.N. Doc. 8429 (1971) (entitled "Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of
the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective
guarantee and observance of human rights;" "Reaffirming the inalienable rights of all
peoples, and in particular those of the Palestinian people, to freedom, equality, and selfdetermination, and the legitimacy of their struggles to restore those rights."); G.A. Res.
2949 (XXVII) (8 Dec. 1972), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 82, U.N. Doc. 8429
(1971).
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Yasser Arafat stating that, in light of the PLO's acceptance of U.N.
resolutions 242 and 338, its recognition of Israel's right to exist, and its
commitment to renounce terrorism, Israel recognized the PLO "as the
representative of the Palestinian people."95 Further, in the DOP itself,
the Government of Israel and the PLO, as representative of the Palestinian people, agreed to "recognize their mutual, legitimate and political
rights,"96 words the two parties reaffirm in their subsequent agreements. 97 Although these commitments by Israel fall short of the PLO's
recognition of Israel's right "to exist in peace and security," 98 they represent formal recognition that the Palestinians possess "legitimate and
political rights" as a people. The scope of the rights recognized by Israel
is, however, difficult to assess.
The agreements concluded between the PLO and Israel pursuant to
the DOP are silent with regard to Palestinian self-determination. The
U.N. Security Council resolutions to which the agreements refer make
no direct reference to the issue of self-determination or even name the
Palestinian people, Resolution 242 affirming only the need for "a just
settlement of the refugee problem." 99 The U.N. General Assembly recently has made some effort to link Palestinian self-determination to
Resolution 242. Following the conclusion of the DOP, the Assembly
passed a resolution reaffirming that final status negotiations between
Israel and the PLO should be based, inter alia, upon:
(a) [t]he realization of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian
people, primarilythe right to self-determination,(b) [t]he withdrawal of
Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and from the other occupied Arab territories, [and] (c) guaranteeing arrangements for peace and security for all States in the region, including those named in resolution 181(11) of 29 November 1947,
within secure and internationallyrecognized boundaries.100

The resolution, therefore, not only expresses the Assembly's sense
that Palestinian self-determination should be a basis of permanent
status negotiations, but also incorporates the principle into Resolution
242 by including the states named by Resolution 181 (and therefore, the
Arab State envisaged by the 1947 Partition Plan) among the States
whose borders should be respected. Israel and the United States both
voted against the resolution, however, with Israel asserting that it predetermined the outcome of permanent status negotiations and the
United States seeking to avoid focusing on "divisive and polarizing

95. Letter from Yitzkah Rabin to Yasser Arafat, THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE
AGREEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 128-29 (Inst. For Palestinian Studies, ed. 1993)
[hereinafter THE PALESTINIAN ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT].

96. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2, at 1527.
97. See Interim Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl.; Gaza-Jericho Agreement, pmbl.
98. THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 128.

99. See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 87; S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., at 10,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973); Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 35.
100. G.A. Res. 48/158D, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. (1993) (emphasis added).
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statements."101
It is, therefore, uncertain whether the governments of Israel and
the United States recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination.
In view of Israel's acknowledgment that the Palestinians are a people
and possess the "legitimate rights" attendant to that status, Israel's
unwillingness to support the General Assembly Resolution may arise
from the view that, even if the Palestinians do possess a right to selfdetermination, as the vast majority of the international community has
recognized, the ultimate status of the territory that they claim is not
theirs alone to decide. That is, that the OPT do not constitute a viable
self-determination unit. As discussed below, however, that position is
difficult to reconcile with international practice regarding the disposition of non-self-governing territories.
C. The Territory of Palestine
A people's right to exercise self-determination is constrained by the
status of the territory to which they lay claim. As Professor Bassiouni
suggests, "[iun the abstract, people determine their goals regardless of
geographic limitations; however, realistically, [self-determination] is
exercisable only when it can be actuated within a given territory susceptible of acquiring the characteristics of sovereignty. .102
Thus,
while
authoritative international
instruments
recognize
selfdetermination to be a right of all peoples, the full exercise of that right,
in practice, has been restricted to the populations of certain classes of
territory. Owing perhaps, to the fact that the law of self-determination
has developed largely within the context of decolonization, the territories most universally recognized to be "self-determination units" have
been mandate territories and the former colonial holdings of metropolitan States.
In order to assess the scope of the Palestinian right to selfdetermination, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which the OPT
themselves comprise a self-determination unit. The provisional recognition of Palestine's independence in the League of Nations Covenant
and in U.N. Resolution 181(11) arguably confers this status upon Palestine. 10 3 As argued below, however, this status can also be seen to
emerge from the U.N. Charter's provisions regarding the disposition of
non-self-governing territories. While the OPT may not be a former colonial territory per se, and Israel's role in the OPT has been one of a
belligerent occupant rather than an administering authority, the OPT
otherwise conform to the Charter's definition of a non-self-governing
101. 1993 U.N.Y.B. 530, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1.
102. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 34.
103. With the exception of the U.S. administered Pacific Islands, all "A" , "B" and "C"
Mandates have achieved independence. See CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 426-28. See also
Allen Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank,
14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 24-27 (1973) (arguing that sovereignty in mandated territories re-

sides ultimately in their populations, who have the right eventually to exercise that sovereignty through independence).
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territory. Since international law has evolved to recognize the right of
the populations of all non-self-governing territories to selfdetermination, so too must Israel recognize the Palestinians' right to
self-determination on their territory.
Based on the framework established by the U.N. Charter for the
definition and disposition of non-self-governing territories, the OPT
constitute a self-determination unit. Although the U.N. General Assembly has interpreted Chapter XI of the Charter primarily to apply to
territories that were colonies in 1945,104 the Charter, itself, requires
U.N. Members "which have or assume responsibilities for the admini106
stration"10 5 of non-self-governing territories to abide by its provisions.
This suggests that it is applicable to territories acquired by metropolitan States after 1945.107 The General Assembly's subsequent resolutions analogizing the Palestinian liberation movement to other anticolonial movements imply, moreover, that the OPT possess characteristics similar to the colonial territories to which Chapter XI has been recognized to apply. Further, as discussed below, the OPT conform to
Chapter XI's definition of non-self-governing territories in that they are
separate from, distinct from, and subordinate to Israel, the State presently administering them.
Under U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1541, there is a prima
facie obligation to transmit information "in respect of a territory which
is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally
from the country administering it."108 The OPT meet all three criteria.
The OPT's geographic separateness from Israel is apparent from a
number of factors. First, the international community - including both
the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly - consistently
has regarded Israel's presence in the OPT as an occupation of foreign
territory and has demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces. 109 Second, while members of the Israeli polity have laid claims to the OPT on
the basis of religious, political, security, and other interests, the Government of Israel has not annexed the OPT.110 Accordingly, Israel has

104. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 24, at Annex, Principle 1.
105. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73 (emphasis added).
106. See CRAWFORD, supranote 8, at 359-60.
107. Id.
108. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 24, at Annex, Principle IV.
109. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/62D, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess. (1994); G.A. Res. 2443(XXII1),
U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess. (1968). The fact that the U.N. Security Council and the General
Assembly have demanded that Israel recognize the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT confirms its view that the OPT are not seen as part of the
State of Israel. See The Situation in the Arab Territories Occupied by Israel, S.C. Res.
446, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979); G.A. Res. 48/41 B, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 114, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (demanding that Israel
accept de jure applicability of Fourth Geneva Convention to OPT).
110. Although the Knesset extended Israeli law over East Jerusalem shortly after its
occupation in 1967 and made "unified Jerusalem" the capital of Israel in 1980, its Annexation has been condemned by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council. G.A.
Res. 49/87A, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess. (1994) (citing past resolutions); S.C. Res. 252, U.N.
SCOR, 23d Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968).
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imposed a separate legal regime upon the OPT than that prevailing in
Israel, and Palestinian residents of the territories have been granted no
right to citizenship in Israel. Finally, the express terms of the Interim
Agreement concluded between Israel and the PLO affirm that both parties see the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "as a single territorial unit,
the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim
period."''
While the Interim Agreement does not indicate precisely
what "status" will be preserved, it does affirm that the OPT constitute a
distinct, coherent territorial unit.
The population of the OPT, moreover, is to a great extent ethnically
and culturally distinct from the population of Israel. 112 The distinctions between the two populations were explicitly recognized in the
United Nations 1947 Partition Plan and are the implicit basis for the
international community's recognition of Palestinian peoplehood. The
differences in the predominant languages and religions of the two
populations also attest to this distinction. While almost two hundred
thousand Israeli citizens presently reside in the OPT, their presence in
the Territories has repeatedly been condemned by the international
community as an illegal contravention of humanitarian law. 113 They
constitute, moreover, only a small percentage of the Territories' total
population. The OPT, therefore, are geographically, ethnically, and culturally distinct from the State of Israel. On that basis, there exists a
presumption under Principle IV that the OPT is a non-self-governing
territory under Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.
Once the prima facie case described in Principle IV has been met,
Principle V provides for scrutiny of other elements of the relationship
between the concerned territory and the metropolitan State in order to
assess the extent to which the territory has been placed "in a position or
status of subordination."'" 4 As discussed in Part II(C), below, the OPT
remain almost entirely under Israeli authority and control, even though
portions of the Territories have been administered by the PA since June
1994.
The OPT, therefore, possess the attributes, though not the formal
111. Interim Agreement, supra note 5, at ch. 2, art. 11, para. 1.
112. I must admit that I speak of ethnic and cultural distinctions with some hesitation. Ethnicity and culture are dynamic, largely imagined concepts that, like the communities they are used to describe, resist rigid delineation. It is, after all, only an accident of
history that we do not now speak of "Jewish Palestinians" with lack of irony with which
we speak of "Christian Palestinians." Many writers have reflected thoughtfully on these
issues. See, e.g., BENEDICT R. O'G. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF
CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973); FRANTZ FANON,
THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington trans., 1968); FRANCOISE LIONNET,
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL VOICES: RACE, GENDER, SELF-PORTRAITURE (1989); EDWARD W.
SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
113. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 85-86 & nn. 152-53 (1990) (citing U.N. General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions condemning Israeli settlement activity).
114. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 24, Annex, Principle V.
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status, of a non-self-governing territory under the terms of Chapter XI
of the U.N. Charter. It would be naive, if not cynical, however, to characterize Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as a form of
trusteeship, although at least one writer has suggested that Israel assume the role of "trustee-occupant. 11- Since Israel is an occupying
power with significant economic and political interests in the OPT and
a relationship of extreme enmity with its population, it is unlikely that
its acceptance of "the obligation to promote to the utmost.., the wellbeing of the inhabitants" 116 of the West Bank and Gaza would be received with great confidence by the Palestinian population. The point of
demonstrating the OPT's functional status as a non-self-governing territory is not, therefore, in order to recommend a shift in Israel's status
from occupant to trustee but, rather, to show that the OPT possess the
requisite characteristics for the exercise of self-determination. The OPT
are a coherent and distinct territorial unit that is separate, both legally
and practically, from Israel. In light of the fact that the populations of
other non-self-governing territories that meet these criteria have been
seen to possess the right to self-determination, the OPT should be recognized to constitute a legitimate self-determination unit.
II. PALESTINIAN PUBLIC BODIES
The international community, therefore, has recognized the Palestinians' status as a people, the centrality of their participation to equitable resolution of the Palestine question, and, by and large, their inalienable right under the United Nations Charter and other international
instruments to self-determination. This recognition of Palestinian peoplehood - and the international participation it has facilitated - has
resulted, to a great extent, from the establishment of Palestinian public
bodies, which have served both as constitutive expressions of Palestinian nationhood and as vehicles for the pursuit of self-determination.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has, for many years, represented - in the myriad senses of the word - the Palestinian people.
Through the PLO, the Palestinians have established a symbolic State
and a very real administrative authority. This section examines the
functions and international status of each of these bodies.
A. The PalestineLiberation Organization
Over the last thirty years, the PLO has emerged as the international representative of the Palestinian people and has played an instrumental role in defining and pursuing Palestinian national aspirations. This section analyzes the PLO's legitimacy as representative of
the Palestinian people and its international status, as it has developed
since its establishment in 1964.

115. Gerson, supra note 103, at 45-47.
116. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
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1. Representation of the Palestinian People
In January 1964, Egyptian president Gamal abd-el-Nasser convened the first Arab Summit Conference in an attempt to formulate responses to Israel's plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River for its
own use. Although the Conference proved unable to develop a viable
strategy to counteract Israel's plans, it did recommend the establishment of "a sound basis for organizing the Palestinian people in order to
enable them to assume their duties in liberating their homeland and
determining their destiny." 117 Accordingly, a council selected by committees composed of Palestinians in various Arab countries met that
spring and on June 1, 1964 established the PLO and adopted the Palestine National Covenant. Although the Covenant is occasionally referred
to as the "PLO Covenant," it is more than an organizational charter. By
its own terms, at least, it represents a constitutive expression of Palestinian nationhood; defining the Palestinian people and articulating
their national character and aspirations, as well as establishing the
PLO to act as their international representative and to work toward
vindication of their national rights.
The Covenant defines the Palestinian people in ethnic, temporal,
and territorial terms. Perhaps reflecting the emphasis at the time of its
enactment on the principle of Arab unity, the Covenant's first article
proclaims, "Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian people. It is an
inseparable part of the bigger Arab nation, and its people are an integral part of the Arab people."' 18 The Covenant, therefore, situates both
the territory of Palestine and the Palestinian people within the Arab
nation. Although this provision arguably is designed more to emphasize the incongruity of the "Zionist-imperialist"119 presence in the region
than to define an ethnic or cultural criterion for Palestinian nationality.
More substantively, the Covenant defines the Palestinian people in
temporal and territorial terms. Article Five states, "[t]he Palestinians
are those Arab citizens who under normal conditions used to live in
Palestine1 20 until 1947; they include those who remained there as well
as those who were evicted. The offsprings [sic] of an Arab Palestinian
parent, since that date, whether born in Palestine or outside, are regarded as Palestinians."'121 The Covenant also states that "Jews who
117. NASSAR, supra note 57, at 20. President Nasser initially proposed creating a
"Palestinian entity." Id. at 19. During discussion of the issue, the leaders of the Arab
states represented at the conference, suggested a variety of forms, ranging from the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (which at the time were occupied by Jordan and Egypt, respectively) to the formation of a national liberation front.
See LEILA KADI, ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCES AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 99 (1966).
118. Palestine National Covenant, art. 1, reprinted in NASSAR, supra note 57, app. 2 at
219.
119. Palestine National Covenant, art. 15, reprinted in NASSAR, supra note 57, app. 2
at 220.
120. See generally Palestine National Covenant, art. 2, reprinted in NASSAR, supra
note 57, app. 2 at 219 (defining Palestine in terms of "the borders that existed during the
British Mandate").
121. Palestine National Covenant, art. 5, reprintedin NASSAR, supra note 57, app. 2 at
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used to live under normal conditions in Palestine until the Zionist invasion of the country are to be considered Palestinians."' 122 The Covenant,
therefore, defines the Palestinians as the people who resided in the territory of Palestine, as delimited by the British Mandate, before 1947 (or,
for Jewish Palestinians, before 1923) and their descendants.
Having thus defined the Palestinian people, the Covenant assigns
to the PLO the role of facilitating the liberation of their homeland. This
role is apparent not only from its name - the Palestine Liberation Organization - but also from article 26 of the Covenant:
The Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents all the
forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the activities of
the Arab Palestinian people in their struggle to liberate their land and
return to it to practice their right to self-determination. This applies to
all military, political, and financial matters, as well as anything related
123
to the Palestinian problem on the Arab and international levels.
The Covenant makes clear that, whatever functions the PLO might
assume in relation to the Palestinian people and the international
community, its overriding goal is securing for the Palestinian people the
opportunity to return to their homeland under circumstances that will
enable them to exercise self-determination. Since its creation, the PLO
has developed an elaborate bureaucratic structure and administers a
variety of social services to Palestinians in diaspora. Nevertheless, its
focus has not been the amelioration of conditions in exile, but rather the
termination of the condition of exile. While it has on occasion played a
significant role in the national politics of other countries in the region
(despite the Covenant's commitment to the contrary), 124 it has not
sought to represent the interests of Palestinians as members of the national communities of the States in which they reside. Rather, its political activities have focused on those States' policies regarding Israel
and the question of Palestine. It is in this capacity that the PLO characterizes itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
25
people.
The internal legitimacy of this claim among the Palestinian people

219.
122. Palestine National Covenant, art. 6, reprintedin NASSAR, supra note 57, app. 2 at
219. The PLO selected 1923 as the year when the "Zionist invasion" began. As Cherif
Bassiouni has pointed out, however, "That cut-off date is debatable since Palestinian
Arab representatives agreed in the ensuing years to an immigration quota which allowed
for the lawful entry of many European Jews." Baussiouni, supra note 8, at 38.
123. Palestine National Covenant, art. 26, reprintedin NASSAR, supra note 57, app. 2
at 222 (emphasis added).
124. See Palestine National Covenant, art. 27, reprinted in NASSAR, supra note 57,
app. 2 at 222 ("The Palestine Liberation Organization cooperates with all Arab States,
each according to its potentials, and it adheres to a neutral policy in its relations with
these States in the light of the requirements of the liberation battle. On the basis of this,
it does not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab State").
125. As discussed in the next section, the international community roundly accepts the
PLO's claim to represent the Palestinian people.
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has been consistently affirmed. As a liberation organization representing the sometimes disparate interests of a dispersed population, the
PLO has not functioned democratically at all times. 126 Nevertheless,
Palestinians continually have identified the PLO as their international
representative since its founding in 1964. Palestinian labor unions and
women's and students' groups pledged their support for the organization promptly after it was created, and they have continued to regard it
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.1 27 Other
Palestinian institutions, including newspapers, political parties, and
guerrilla groups, also have acknowledged the legitimacy of the PLO's
representative status. 128 Perhaps most indicative of the internal legitimacy of the PLO, however, has been the consistent failure of other
States to circumvent it in their dealings with the Palestinians. Israel,
for instance, was unable to establish an alternative Palestinian leadership structure in the Occupied Territories in the 1970s, when the
elected mayors in the West Bank agreed to confine their dealings with
the Israelis to municipal matters on the grounds that the PLO was the
"political representative" of all of the Palestinian people. 129 Similarly,
even though the PLO did not participate directly in the 1991 Madrid
Conference, the Palestinian delegation affirmed in its response to the
invitation to participate that "[t]he fact that the PLO has agreed not to
be directly or overtly involved in the process at present, does not in any
way prejudice its role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere, and the only body empowered to negotiate or
conclude agreements on behalf of the Palestinian people."'130 The PLO,
therefore, has firmly established its status among Palestinians as their
sole international representative.
A brief review of the organization's institutions of internal governance reveals some of the contours of this representation. Although the
PLO has not sought recognition as a government in exile,' 3 ' its institutions are modeled after governmental structures and provide Palestinians worldwide with an array of social services. 132 The PLO has two
primary policymaking organs: the Palestine National Council (PNC), a
300 to 400 member body that functions as the PLO's legislative branch;
and the Executive Committee, a fifteen member council apparently
based in form on the British cabinet system. 133 The PNC, alone, is empowered to make or change basic PLO policy positions. 3 4 Its members,
126. See NASSAR, supra note 57, at 74-76 (discussing democratic and autocratic strains
apparent in PLO politics).
127. Id. at 30-31.
128. Id. at 31-36.
129. Id. at 35. See generally 7 J. PALESTINE STUD. 132-36 (1978) (presenting Israeli
press coverage regarding Palestinian municipal elections and PLO).
130. Palestinian Response to Madrid Invitation, Oct. 22, 1991. THE PALESTINIANISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 14.

131.
132.
133.
134.
(1984).

See notes 140-41, infra and accompanying text.
See NASSAR, supra note 37, at 68-73.
Id. at 50.
William V. O'Brien, The PLO in International Law, 2 B.U. INT'L L. J. 349, 355
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who serve three-year terms, assemble annually to consider the report of
the Executive Committee, the Organization's budget, proposals by various committees, and other policy matters. 135 PNC members originally
were elected based upon a geographic scheme, under which members of
the PLO assembled quarterly on the local level to elect representatives. 136 Following the 1967 War, however, the PLO adopted an occupational electoral scheme, in order to make mobilization possible under
Israeli occupation, since Israel permitted the organization of professional and labor unions. 137 Presently, the various Palestinian resistance organizations (e.g. Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and mass unions and syndicates (e.g. the General
Union of Palestinian Women and the General Union of Palestinian Students) hold seats on the Council in much the same way as would political parties in a national legislature. 13
The PLO Executive Committee has the mandate of establishing
and supervising the organization's bureaucratic institutions and of ensuring that PNC policies are implemented. 139 Originally, the Chairman
of the Committee, who is appointed by the National Council, selected
the members of the Executive Committee, but the system was altered
later to require their election by the Council. 40 Yasser Arafat has been
Chairman of the Executive Committee since his election to the position
at the fifth session of the PNC in February 1969.141
The PLO's institutional structure to a great extent reflects its mandate. It was conceived as and remains a liberation organization. It has
never characterized itself as a government-in-exile. According to Anis
Kassim, "authoritative officials of the PLO" have taken the position that
the establishment of a government-in-exile would "create problems of
dual loyalty for Palestinians living in different countries" and possibly
"invite conflicts with host governments."'142 Kassim suggests that, while
the PLO might seek to establish such a government at some point in the
future, the Palestinians remain - or remained (Kassim wrote in 1980)
- too "far way from realizing their objectives" to make it a prudent enterprise. 143 Moreover, it is unclear whether the PLO has the power to

135. NASSAR, supra note 57, at 50.
136. Id. at 73.
137. Id. at 73-74.
138. See generally id. at 60-61. Fateh has been the largest movement in the PLO since
1969. See generally id. at 80-86. It should be noted that the various unions with representatives in the PLO are not occupational in the traditional sense - they do not represent the interests of workers as workers, for instance. As Nassar explains, "[t]hese unions
are formed around political and social issues rather than work-related questions. These
unions do not concern themselves with worker-management matters, but function mainly
to mobilize their members behind the Palestinian cause." Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 60-61.
142. Anis Kassim, The PalestinianLiberation Organization'sClaim to Status: A JuridicialAnalysis Under InternationalLaw, 9 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 31-32 (1980).
143. Id. Although there was some expectation that the PLO might move to establish
itself as a government body following the issuance of the Palestinian Declaration of Inde-
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reconstitute itself in that way. As noted above, the Palestine National
Covenant assigns the PLO the role of facilitating circumstances through
which Palestinians can exercise their right to self-determination on
their territory. The PLO's role ends, therefore, when the exercise of
self-determination begins. 144 Under the Covenant, the PLO does not
have the power to determine, itself, how to constitute the Palestinian
nation; whether, for example, it should take the form of an independent
State or should enter into an association with another State. Since the
PLO's international legitimacy emerges from its role as representative
of the Palestinian people, the power ultimately to ratify or decline
agreements regarding the final status of Palestine remains with the
Palestinian people.
2. International Status
a. Recognition
The Palestine Liberation Organization's legitimacy as the international representative of the Palestinian people has been affirmed consistently by the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council,
and other constituent organs, as well as by most States in the international system, including, since 1993, Israel and the United States.
However, few States or organizations outside of the Arab World have
recognized the PLO as a government.
United Nations
The United Nations General Assembly has extended recognition to
the PLO as the international representative of the Palestinian people
and, accordingly, has facilitated its participation in United Nations activities. As discussed above, the General Assembly recognized, in the
early 1970s, the rights of the Palestinian people to participate in the
settlement of the Palestine question and, more broadly, to selfdetermination. Pursuant to this recognition, in October 1974, it invited
the PLO, which one month earlier had been affirmed by the Arab
League to be "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,"1 45 to participate during plenary sessions in its deliberations re-

pendence, it has not taken steps formally to alter its status. NASSER, supranote 57, at 43.
144. Testimony introduced on behalf of the PLO in litigation related to the Achille
Lauro incident conforms to this conception of the PLO's role: "The PLO describes itself as
'the internationally recognized representative of a sovereign people who are seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination, national independence, and territorial integrity.
The PLO is the internationally recognized embodiment of the nationhood and sovereignty
of the Palestinian people while they await the restorationof their rights through the establishment of a coomprehensive [sic],just and lasting peace in the Middle East.'" Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Ramsey Clark Aff.,
Apr. 27, 1987) (emphasis added).
145. THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 210-11. The Rabat Summit marked Jordan's acquiescence to the PLO's claim to represent the Palestin-

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:1

garding the question of Palestine. 146 Shortly thereafter, the General
Assembly approved even broader participation by the Palestinian people in United Nations activities, requesting the Secretary General "to
establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all
matters concerning the question of Palestine."'147 Finally, during the
same session, the General Assembly granted the PLO the status of observer, inviting it to participate in the work of the General Assembly
and of all international conferences convened either by the General Assembly or under the auspices of other United Nations organs. 148 Accordingly, a number of United Nations organs and independent agencies have extended observer status to the PLO or have cooperated with
49
it to provide services to the Palestinian people.
The observer status granted to the PLO gives it broader access to
General Assembly activities than that granted to any other non-state
entity. For instance, while the PLO has access to both the plenary and
Main Committees of the General Assembly, 15 0 the other national liberation movements (excepting the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)) have been accorded access only to the Main Committees, 151 and their participation in General Assembly activities has been
limited to deliberations regarding the territories that they claim to represent. 5 2 The other liberation movements, moreover, have been invited
to participate only in United Nations conferences, meetings, and other
seminars that concern their countries, while the PLO and SWAPO before Namibia's independence - have been invited to participate in
the sessions and work of all such conferences. 5 3 Non-governmental organizations, similarly, are entitled to attend only public meetings of the
General Assembly and committee meetings on items relevant to their
work. 54 Even intergovernmental organizations generally have access

ian people after having previously claimed that role for itself. Kassim, supra note 141, at
18 n.99.
146. G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX), supra note 91, at 3.
147. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. doc. A/9631 (1974). The vote on
this resolution was 89 in favor, 8 against, and 37 abstentions. Israel and the United
States were among the states voting against the resolution. Patrick J. Travers, The Legal
Effect of United Nations Action In Support of the PalestinianLiberation Organizationand
the National Liberation Movements if Africa, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 561, 570-71 (1976). In
its 1975 session, the General Assembly emphasized that Palestinian participation in U.N.
deliberations regarding the Middle East would be on "equal footing" with all other parties. U.N. GAOR, 301h Sess., Supp. No 34, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
148. G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). This resolution reflected the General Assembly's broader objective of
shifting the role of observers from simple observation to active participation. See Erik
Suy, The Status of Observers in International Organizations, 160 ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONALE 75,130-31 (1978).
149. Travers, supra note 147, at 569-75.
150. Suy, supra note 148, at 107 (citing G.A. Res. 3237 (XXIX) (1974)).
151. Id.
152. Travers, supra note 147, at 570.
153. Suy, supra note 148, at 111-12.
154. Id. at 106.
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only to international conferences that deal with matters of direct interest to them. 155 Erik Suy, the former Legal Counsel to the United Nations, suggests that the breadth of access afforded the PLO emerges
from the assumption that it is "strongly connected with [the] future
stateo of the people [it] represents" and therefore has "a much wider interest in the works undertaken by the United Nations than regional intergovernmental organizations, the work and interest of which are expected to be more limited."'1 6 The General Assembly, therefore, has
established a unique status for the PLO; while it has not been granted
the full access to U.N. activities accorded Member States, its recognized
connection to the land and people of Palestine has facilitated broader
participation than other non-State entities.
The Security Council has proven less sympathetic to Palestinian
participation than the General Assembly, due in large part to the
United States' traditional rejection of attempts to establish direct links
with the PLO.157 The Security Council has, however, acknowledged the
PLO's representative status. In 1975, and again in 1976 and 1978, it
invited the PLO to take part in the debate over a resolution that would
have condemned Israel for its repeated air attacks on Lebanon. What is
notable about the invitation is that it extended to the PLO "the same
rights conferred upon a member State invited to participate under rule
37,"158 rather than relying upon rule 39, under which the African
movements appeared before the Council. '59 Although the legal validity
and implications of the invitation have been hotly disputed, 60 it appears beyond contention that the Council's decision to structure PLO
participation in this way was calculated to reaffirm the PLO's status as
representative of a people with recognized national rights. Since then,
however, the Security Council has done little to facilitate the expansion
of the PLO's international participation. Other International Organizations
The PLO has also been recognized by and permitted to participate
in the activities of other international organizations, but this recognition largely has been limited to organizations with members sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Arab regional organizations and Islamic organizations have granted the PLO the broadest recognition and
participation, giving it the status and privileges of a State member.

155. Id. at 112.

156. Id.
157. See Travers, supra note 147, at 573.
158. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, No. 1, at 14-15 (1976). "Rule 37 applies to '[a]ny Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council;' rule 39 applies
to 'persons."' Kassim, supra note 142, at 20.
159. Travers, supra note 147, at 573.
160. See, eg., Kassim, supra note 142, at 20-21, 31 (suggesting that invitation and implicit recognition of the PLO by the Security Council constituted authoritative legal
precedent); Evyatar Levine, A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos: Recognition of the
PLO as a Menace to World Public Order, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 259, 259-61 (1981);
Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council and the PLO, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 476-91
(1976).
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Among these organizations are the League of Arab States and its specialized agencies (e.g. the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab Monetary
Fund, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, and the Islamic Development Bank. 161 The nonaligned nations conference also has invited the
participation of the PLO as a full member.162 States
The governments of more than one hundred states have extended
recognition to the PLO, generally in its capacity as the representative of
the Palestinian people. 163 Among these States are most of the countries
in the developing world and former Soviet bloc, as well as China, Japan
and a number of European countries, including France, Belgium, Italy,
Sweden, and Austria. 164 In 1993, moreover, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin wrote a letter to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat stating
that "the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people."'165 More than half of these countries have accorded the PLO full diplomatic status and have authorized
the establishment of PLO embassies within their borders. A number of
others have permitted the PLO to establish offices under the auspices of
the Arab League. 166 With a few exceptions, however, the embassies
167
have played more of a symbolic role than a practical one.
b. International Status
The international status of the PLO has been a point of some contention among legal scholars. One commentator, Anis Kassim, characterized the PLO as a "territorial public body," which he defined to include "territorial units the elites of which are in the process of
consolidating their respective nation state units.168 He argued that, by
virtue of its broad recognition as the international representative of the
170
Palestinian people, 169 its exercise of typical governmental functions,
and its role as successor to the Arab Higher Committee, which, Kassim
suggested, had elicited de facto recognition as a public body by Great
Britain and Arab governments, 171 the PLO was legally entitled to participate in the international process as representative of the Palestinian
people. 172

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
ISRAELI
166.
167.
168.

See generally YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (33d ed. 1996).
Kassim, supra note 142, at 3 n.3.
O'Brien, supra note 134, at 379.
NASSAR, supra note 57, 163.
Letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzkah Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993), THE PALESTINIANPEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 129.
O'Brien, supra note 134, at 379.
Id. at 380.
Kassim, supra note 142, at 9.

169. Id. at 19-22.
170. Id. at 22-26, 32.
171. Id. at 18.

172. Id. at 33. In support of his position, Kassim cited numerous precedents acknowledging that governments in exile, anti-colonial movements, and fledgling revolutionary
governments are subjects of international law and extending to them recognition com-
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In a critique of Kassim's analysis, Israeli Military Judge Evyatar
Levine suggested that the PLO, as a non-state entity, could claim no
right to international recognition as representative of a people 73 and
that the PLO's lack of control over any portion of the territory it claimed
differentiated it from other revolutionary movements that had received
international recognition. 174 Another critic, Professor William O'Brien,
argued in 1984 that internal divisions prevented the PLO from effectively representing the Palestinian people at the international level:
"[iun its present disarray, the PLO can apparently not perform the most
essential of all functions of an organization purporting to represent a
people, namely, negotiating diplomatically on their behalf."175 O'Brien
suggested, moreover, that the PLO's broad recognition by international
organizations and States had little functional significance since the
PLO had not (in 1984) been recognized by Israel or the United States,
the two States most capable of effecting or stifling Palestinian national
76
aspirations.
Much has changed since these commentators debated the PLO's
status in the early 1980s. The PLO has renounced terrorism and has
established diplomatic connections with Israel and the United States,
both of whom recognize it as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and as a "partner" in the ongoing Middle East peace negotiations. Also, the PLO is substantially connected to the Palestinian
administration governing sections of the OPT under the DOP and its
progeny. In view of these developments, the objections cited above to
Kassim's characterization of the PLO as a "territorial public body," and,
more broadly, to the PLO's participation in the international process
lack currency. While, as discussed below, neither the establishment of
the "State of Palestine" in 1988 or the PA in 1994 has altered the PLO's
international role and status, both have helped to facilitate universal
recognition of the PLO as international representative of the Palestinian people.
B. The "State"of Palestine
1. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence
During its nineteenth session, in November 1988, the PNC voted to
adopt the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, proclaiming "the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with
its capital Holy Jerusalem." 177 The Declaration clearly was conceived,

mensurate with that granted to nascent states. Id. at 9-13.
173. Levine, supra note 160, at 247-48.
174. Id. at 248-49.
175. O'Brien, supra note 134, at 392.
176. Id. at 392-95.
177. PalestinianDeclarationof Independence, 19th Sess., para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/431827
(1988) (hereinafter Declaration of Independence].
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in part, as a symbolic gesture in support of the Palestinian intifada,
which at that time had been in progress for eleven months. 178 The
terms of the Declaration, however, suggest that the PNC intended for
the Declaration to have broader consequences. Following its expulsion
from Lebanon in 1982, the PLO leadership began to focus more resolutely on achieving a negotiated settlement with Israel within an internationally-mediated framework. To that end, it heightened its efforts to
fortify its international legitimacy, pursuing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States and engaging in an informal
dialogue with leaders of the Israeli peace movement. The Declaration
of Independence appears designed to legitimate the PLO's political
agenda by reconciling it with the already-existing legal framework established by the United Nations for resolution of the Palestine question.
The Declaration of Independence bases its proclamation of Palestine's independence on two specific international commitments to the
Palestinian people and, more generally, on the principles enshrined in
the United Nations Charter. First, it makes reference to the League of
Nations' recognition of Palestine as a provisionally independent nation
in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and in the Treaty of
Lausanne, 179 arguing that those authorities confirm the falsehood of the
notion that Palestine was ever a "land without a people." Secondly, it
characterizes the 1947 partition plan endorsed in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 as bestowing "international legitimacy" upon the
Palestinian Arab people's claim to self-determination and sovereignty. 8 0 Since the PNC voted, after its adoption of the Declaration, to
declare the territorial boundaries of the state of Palestine to be the
West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, the Declaration's evocation of Resolution 181 appears to represent a retroactive acceptance of the principle of dividing Palestine into two states, the idea
being that nothing has occurred since 1947 that would nullify the Palestinian right to sovereignty recognized in Resolution 181.
Finally, the Declaration states that the occupation of Palestinian
land has subverted the Charter and subsequent resolutions of the
United Nations, which guarantee "the right of Return, the right of independence, [and] the right to sovereignty over territory and homeland."' 81 Although it does not make reference to a specific provision of
the U.N. Charter, several clauses of the Charter could be construed as
bestowing these rights on the Palestinians. The Charter states, for instance, that one of the purposes of the United Nations is the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin178. Id. para. 9 (speaking of the intifada as having been the decisive change prompting Palestinian independence). See also Youssef M. Ibrahim, P.L.O. Proclaims Palestine
to be an Independent State; Hints at Recognizing Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1988, at Al
("The announcement by the Palestinian council had been expected for months. Leaders of
the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza have demanded the gesture in recognition of their 11-month-long insurrection...").
179. Declaration of Independence, supra note 177, para. 4.
180. Id. para. 5.
181. Id. para. 6.
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ciple of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples ....1,82 Article 55
of the Charter uses a similar formula to express the United Nations'
goals in the fields of social and economic development and human
rights. Further, Article 73 compels U.N. members assuming responsibility for non-self-governing territories "to develop self-government, to
take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions,
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement."' 18 3 Finally, the U.N.
General Assembly has interpreted the Charter's requirement that
States refrain from the use of force in international relations as a prohibition of action that "deprives peoples under foreign domination of
their right to self-determination and freedom and independence and of
their right to determine freely their political status and pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development."'18 4 These provisions of the
Charter can all be seen to legitimize the Palestinians' claims to selfdetermination and the pursuit of sovereignty.
Beyond demonstrating the legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations within the established international legal framework, however,
it is unclear precisely what purpose the Declaration is intended to
serve. Despite its retroactive acceptance of Resolution 181 and, shortly
thereafter, its acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the PNC
made no effort following the Declaration to reconstitute itself as a government-in-exile and, thereby, to formalize Palestine's status as a State
under occupation. Similarly, the PNC Central Council's election of
Yasser Arafat to the position of President of the State appears to have
been little more than honorific, there having been no apparent distinction between his responsibilities as President and as Chairman of the
PLO. As suggested by the Declaration's call to other Arab peoples "to
consolidate and enhance the emergence in reality of our state,"'1 5 the
PNC's decision to proclaim the independence of Palestine appears to
have been a largely symbolic gesture, an attempt to affirm the reasonableness and international legal legitimacy of the Palestinian cause.
2. International Recognition
To the extent that the Declaration was conceived as an effort to
bolster the international legitimacy of the Palestinian national liberation movement, it met with considerable success. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Israel's Likud-dominated coalition government refused to recognize the legitimacy of any unilateral action taken by the PLO, which it
continued to regard as a terrorist organization. 8 6 A number of other
182. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 1 2 (emphasis added).
183. Id. art. 73(b).
184. G.A. Res. 2160 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (apparently basing prohibition of denial of self-determination on Charter
art. 2(4)); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 89-90.
185. Declaration of Independence, supra note 177, para. 12 (emphasis added).
186. 1988 U.N.Y.B. 208, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.100.
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nations welcomed the move, however, at least thirteen of them immediately recognizing the newly-declared state. 187 By April 1989, 114 na188
tions had extended some form of recognition to the Palestinian state,
but the majority of these countries appear to have recognized the State
to be a legitimate aspiration, not an existing reality. 189
The U.N. General Assembly took a similar approach. In Resolution
43/177, the General Assembly voted to replace the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" with "Palestine" within the United Nations system, but it did so "without prejudice to the observer status and
functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United
Nations system." 190 Thus, while the General Assembly (on a vote of
104-2-36, the United States and Israel voting against the resolution)
explicitly affirmed the Palestinians' right to exercise their sovereignty
over the West Bank and Gaza, it stopped short of altering the status of
the PLO. Significantly, however, the General Assembly ratified the
Declaration's interpretation of Resolution 181 as legitimating the establishment in the Occupied Territories of a Palestinian state. 191 In
subsequent resolutions, moreover, the General Assembly began to interpret U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 to require that the territorial integrity of the States created by Resolution 181 be respected, appearing, thereby, to recognize the PNC's retroactive acceptance of the
1947 Partition Plan and affirming that the terms of the Plan continue
to legitimate the Palestinians' claim to self-determination.
C. The PalestinianInterim Self-Government Authority (PA)
Over the course of several months in 1993, while formal peace negotiations within the framework established by the 1991 Madrid Peace
Conference proceeded separately (and largely without progress), representatives of the Israeli government and the PLO engaged in at least
fourteen rounds of secret meetings in Oslo, the process mediated by the
late Johann Jorgen Holst, former foreign minister of Norway. This process led to formal mutual recognition between the State of Israel and
the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, and to the
formulation of the DOP, which was signed on September 13, 1993 by Is-

187. 13 Countries Back PalestinianMove, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1988, at A10.
188. Arafat is Elected President of State He Hopes to Form, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1989,
at A3.
189. The U.S.S.R., for instance, recognized "the proclamation of the Palestinian state,"
but noted that its "practical" creation would result from a "comprehensive settlement" in
the region. Phillip Taubman, Moscow Lauds P.L.O. State But Is Vague on Recognition,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1988, § 1, at 4. Similarly, Egypt, Norway, and Spain expressed support for the PNC move, although they did not bestow formal recognition on the State of
Palestine. 13 CountriesBack PalestinianMove, supra note 185.
190. G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 62, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988).
191. The General Assembly acknowledged its awareness "of the proclamation of the
State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council in line with GeneralAssembly resolution 181 (II) and in exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people." Id. (emphasis added).
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raeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Mahmoud 'Abbas, head of the
PLO's Political Department. The DOP created a framework for longterm negotiations regarding the final status of the OPT and the establishment in the interim period of a Palestinian self-governing authority.
Subsequent agreements concluded between the Government of Israel
and the PLO further defined the functions and jurisdiction of this PA,
which began to administer portions of the OPT in May 1994.
This section analyzes the PA's jurisdiction and claim to legitimacy
with a view toward evaluating its legal status in relation to Israel, the
PLO, the Palestinian people, and the international community.
1. Jurisdiction
The powers, structure, and jurisdiction of the PA are defined by the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip (IA), which was concluded in Washington, D.C. on September 28,
1995, pursuant to Article VII of the DOP. 192 The Interim Agreement, as
its name suggests, is a self-consciously temporary arrangement. While
it governs the administration of portions of the OPT during "the transitional period," the Agreement is purposefully vague about both to what
and from what the parties are making a transition. 193 It makes no fundamental changes to the legal status of the OPT194 and, indeed, explicitly limits its effect to the interim period. 195 The OPT, therefore, remain
under Israeli occupation, even if Palestinians are now afforded a
broader role in their administration. Accordingly, the authority of the
Palestinian governing institutions established by the DOP is entirely
local in character.
The central components of the Palestinian Interim SelfGovernment Authority (PA) are a Council with limited legislative
authority, a President, and an executive authority.
The Interim
Agreement fixes the size of the Council at eighty-two members 196 and
provides for the democratic election of its members by registered Palestinian voters residing in the OPT, including (parts of) Jerusalem. 97

192. Because the IA supersedes earlier agreements between the PLO and Israel, such
as the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Interim Agreement, pmbl., cl. 10,
this essay does not address the terms of the other agreements. Interim Agreement, 36
I.L.M. 551, 558.
193. The only constraint on final status negotiations acknowledged by the Interim
Agreement is that the permanent settlement must be "based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." Id. pmbl., at 558.
194. Article 31 of the Interim Agreement states, "Neither side shall initiate or take
any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the
outcome of the permanent status negotiations." Id. ch. 5, art. 31, cl. 7, at 567.
195. Article 31 of the Interim Agreement states, "Nothing in this Agreement shall
prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered
into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims, or positions." Id. art. 31, cl. 6, at 567.
196. Id. ch. 1, art. 4, at 559.
197. See generally id. Annex 3. The IA disqualifies from election candidates who are
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The President of the PA is also democratically-elected. 198 Both the
President and the Council members are to serve throughout the transitional period, which is to have ended by May 4, 1999.199 While the
Council technically possesses both legislative and executive authority,
the IA provides for the delegation of its executive authority to a committee comprised of the President of the PA and other persons appointed by
200
the President and approved by the Council.
The IA strictly enumerates the powers of all three components of
the PA, limiting their authority and jurisdiction to Palestinian affairs at
the local level. Article One of the IA, which sets the basic terms for the
transfer of authority, states that "Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military
government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance
with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred." 20 1 The terms of this provision make
three things clear: first, that the limited authority transferred to the PA
flows from the Israeli military government, not from the Palestinian
people; second, that Israel possesses all residual authority over the
OPT; and, third, that the transfer of authority is defined by agreement
of both sides, not unilaterally by Israel. The first two points are reflected throughout the IA's provisions regarding the PA's territorial,
functional, and personal jurisdiction, each of which is reviewed in turn
below. The apparent implications of the third point, particularly with
regard to the PA's legitimacy, are discussed later in this essay.
-a. Territorial Jurisdiction
20 2
The IA provides for a phased transfer of territorial jurisdiction
from the Israeli Civil Administration and Military Government to the
PA. Although the Agreement affirms that both sides regard the West
Bank and Gaza Strip as "a single territorial unit, the integrity and
status of which will be preserved during the interim period," 203 it divides that "unit" into a patchwork of smaller districts, each classified
into one of three categories: Area "A," Area "B," and Area "C."204 The IA

members of groups that advocate "racism" or pursue their aims "by unlawful or nondemocratic means." Id. Annex 2, art. 3, para. 2.
198. Id. ch. 1, art. 3, para. 3, at 559.
199. Id. ch. 1, art. 3, para. 4, at 559.
200. Id. ch. 1, art. 5, para. 4. At least 80% of the members of the Executive Authority
must be elected members of the Council. Id. at ch. 1, art. 5, para. 4, cl. (c), at 559.
201. Id. ch. 1, art. 1, para. 1, at 558
202. Territorial jurisdiction is defined in the Interim Agreement as including "land,
subsoil, and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement." Id.
ch. 3, art. 17, para. 2(a), at 564. As discussed below in the functional jurisdiction section,
the Interim Agreement places significant restraints on the exercise of Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in all spheres of authority.
203. Id. ch. 2, art.11, para. 1, at 561.
204. The Gaza Strip is not subject to the same territorial classifications. Gaza effectively is divided into two territories, one under Palestinian authority (as in Areas A and B
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assigns the PA varying degrees of territorial jurisdiction over the areas
in each of these categories.
Area "A" includes portions of major Palestinian population centers
205
in the OPT and represents, in total, three percent of the West Bank.
Pursuant to the IA, the Israeli military redeployed its forces away from
these areas prior to the elections for the Council, which took place on
January 20, 1996. The PA's functional and personal jurisdiction, as defined by the IA, have full force in Area A. The PA also has authority
20 6
over "internal security and public order in Area A."
Area "B", which represents twenty-seven percent of the West
Bank, 207 consists of other Palestinian-populated regions of the OPT, including a number of small towns, villages, and hamlets. Area B, like
Area A, falls entirely within the PA's functional and personal jurisdiction. The "B" areas differ from the "A" areas, however, in two significant respects: first, Israeli redeployment out of these areas is to take
place over a more extended period of time; and, second, while the Council is to assume "responsibility for public order for Palestinians," Israel
maintains "overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of pro208
tecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism."
Area "C" covers all remaining territory in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Included in this category are all Jewish settlements, areas that
Israel considers to be of strategic importance, and unpopulated areas.
Area C encompasses the vast majority of the OPT: thirty-five to forty
percent of the Gaza Strip and approximately seventy percent of the
West Bank. The PA is to assume limited functional and personal jurisdiction (over Palestinians only) in Area C during the first phases of Israeli redeployment. 209 During these initial phases, Israel will retain
complete territorial jurisdiction over Area C, 210 but it is to transfer
gradually "powers and responsibilities relating to territory" to the PA
over an eighteen month period. 211 Settlements and Israeli military installations, however, will remain entirely under Israeli control since
they are considered to be among the "issues that will be negotiated in

of the West Bank) and one under Israeli authority, the latter comprised of the Israeli military installations and settlements in Gaza. Id. ch. 2, art.11, para. 1, at 561.
205. Al Haq, Draft Analysis of Basic Law sec. 1.2.1.
206. Interim Agreement, ch. 2, art. 13, para. 1, 36 I.L.M. 551, 561. During the 1996
session of the Commission on Human Rights, the representative of the Permanent Observer from Palestine criticized Israel for violating this provision of the IA, citing the Israeli assassination in Gaza of Hamas operative Yehia Ayyash.
207. Haq, supra note 205.
208. Interim Agreement, ch. 2, art. 13, para. 2, 36 I.L.M. 551, 562.
209. As of late November 1996, even this limited jurisdiction has not yet been transferred. Id. ch. 2, art. 17, para. 2 (c) (d), at 564.
210. "In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the
Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory... ." Id. ch. 2, art. 11,

para. 2(c), at 561.
211. Id. ch. 2, art. 11, para. 2(e), at 562.
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the permanent status negotiations." ' 212 Israel, moreover, will retain
"authority to exercise its powers and responsibilities with regard to internal security and public order." 213 The Israeli deployment of combat
forces throughout Area C and into Areas A and B in response to mass
demonstrations by Palestinians following the opening of a tunnel beneath the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem suggests that Israel is likely
to continue to interpret this provision as broad authority for pursuing
whatever security measures it deems prudent.
Two additional facets of the Interim Agreement's (IA) territorial jurisdiction provisions bear mention. First, although East Jerusalem legally remains part of the Occupied West Bank, and despite its illegal
annexation by Israel, the IA does not give the PA any form of jurisdiction over the city and its residents, although a small number of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem (5,000) were permitted to register to vote
in Palestinian Council elections. Secondly, although the West Bank city
of al-Khalil (Hebron) has 120,000 Palestinian residents, the IA applies
special arrangements to it for the interim period as a result of the continued presence of 120 Israeli settlers. As Al-Haq summarizes:
The Oslo B Agreement divides al-Khalil into two areas of administration, designated as H-1 and H-2. The Council will assume all civilian powers and responsibilities throughout al-Khalil in relation to Palestinian residents, as in other West Bank cities. In Area H-2 the IDF
will not redeploy and will retain all powers and responsibilities for in214
ternal security and public order.
Thus, under the IA, al-Khalil/Hebron is to be split into two sectors:
one treated essentially as an Area-B territory, with partial PA jurisdiction; the other treated as an Israeli settlement, over which the PA can
exercise no jurisdiction at all. Israel's new Likud administration led by
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed dissatisfaction with
this arrangement, however, and negotiations to revise the provision
have continued for several months without final resolution. 215
During the interim period, therefore, the PA will assume limited
authority over a limited portion of the OPT. The division of the OPT
into these categories and the maintenance of Israeli control over Israeli
settlements, which, particularly in the West Bank, are scattered between Palestinian population centers, ensure that the different areas
under the territorial jurisdiction of the PA are largely non-contiguous.
Palestinians residing within them consequently remain subject to Israeli controls on movement between towns and cities in the West Bank,
as well as between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In these respects,
the IA appears to define the PA's authority in largely popular - as opposed to territorial - terms. This emphasis is also apparent in the IA's

212. Id.
213. Id. Annex 3, art. 4, para. 4.
214. Haq, supra note 205.
215. See Christopher Walker, West Bank Disputes Delay Plan for Summit, THE TIMES
OF LONDON, Dec. 7, 1996.
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provisions concerning the PA's functional and personal jurisdiction.
b. Functional Jurisdiction
The Interim Agreement defines the PA's functional jurisdiction in
specific terms and makes clear that all powers beyond the scope of that
sphere reside with Israel. 216 Accordingly, the IA requires the Palestinian Council to confine its legislative and executive acts to the areas
within its jurisdiction. Legislation that exceeds the scope of the Palestinian Council's authority "or that is otherwise inconsistent with the
provisions of the DOP, [the Interim] Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period" is to be considered void ab initio.27 In order to facilitate the
evaluation of disputed legislation, the IA establishes a Legal Committee
comprised of an equal number of Israelis and Palestinians and requires
the "communication" of all Palestinian legislation to the Israeli side of
the Committee.
Substantively, the functional jurisdiction assigned to the PA is confined to the internal affairs of the Palestinian population in the OPT.
The IA appears to place governmental functions into three primary
categories: (1) functions to be transferred entirely to the Council; (2)
functions to be coordinated between the Council and the Israeli authorities in the OPT; and (3) functions remaining entirely under Israeli
authority. Governmental functions that fall primarily within the province of Palestinian internal affairs - e.g. health, education, culture, etc.
- are placed into the first category; functions that implicate Israeli
concerns in the Territories - primarily infrastructure issues - fall into
the second; and functions related to external affairs, including external
security, fall into the third. In this respect, the Council's functional jurisdiction closely parallels - and, to a great extent, works in tandem
with - its multi-tiered territorial jurisdiction.
The first tier of functional jurisdiction - generally designated
"transfer of authority" by the IA - is characterized by transfer to the
PA of primary authority over issues that concern the Palestinian population exclusively and by required cooperation in any related areas that
conceivably implicate Israeli concerns. For most issues falling into this
category, the IA assigns the PA full authority in Areas A and B and

216. Article 17 of the Interim Agreement states, inter alia:
(3) The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive, and judicial
powers and responsibilities as provided for in this Agreement.
(4) (a) Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas
that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.
(b) To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary
legislative, judicial, and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance
with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.
Interim Agreement, ch. 3, art. 17, paras. 3-4, 36 I.L.M 551, 564.
217. Id.
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provides for a gradual transition of authority in Area C (certain areas,
such as Israeli settlements, remaining permanently outside of PA). For
instance, while the IA provides for the transfer to the PA of "[p]owers
and responsibilities in the sphere of archaeology" in Areas A and B,
authority in area C is to be "transferred gradually;" additionally, the IA
establishes a Joint Committee of experts "to deal with archaeological
issues of common interest" and requires each side to inform the other of
the discovery of any new sites in the sections of the OPT under its jurisdiction. 218 Similarly, while the IA transfers authority to the PA over
social welfare services, it requires the Palestinians, upon request, to
provide Israel with reports regarding juvenile offenders, 219 presumably
to serve Israel's security interests. The IA establishes similar frameworks for the transfer of authority in the following areas: agriculture 220
and forests; 22 1 direct taxation;222 education and culture; 223 gas, fuel,
and petroleum facilities; 224 health; 225 insurance; 226 interior affairs; 227
labor; 228 land registration; 229 legal administration; 230 local government; 231 parks; 232 planning and zoning; 233 population registry and
documentation; 23a postal services; 235 telecommunications; 236 tourism;
218. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 2, para. 4, at 605.
219. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 33, para. 3(b), at 619.
220. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 1, at 604.
221. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 14, at 609.
222. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 8, at 606.
223. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 9, at 607.
224. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 15. The PA must inform Israel of any oil exploration or
production that it undertakes. Id. para. 4(a), at 610.
225. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 17, at 611.
226. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 19, at 612.
227. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 20. "Interior affairs" is defined by the IA as including,
inter alia, "licensing of newspapers and publications and censorship of films and plays."
Id. para. 1, at 613.
228. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 21, at 613.
229. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 22, at 613.
230. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 23, at 614.
231. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 24, at 615. In addition to giving the PA a wide degree of
latitude in defining and managing local government institutions, the IA transfers to the
Palestinian local governments the authority to issue building permits for various purposes. Id. at para. 5.
232. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 26, at 615.
233. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 27, at 616.
234. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 28, at 616-17. Under the IA, the administrative dimensions - e.g. the issuance of identity cards, the maintenance of birth and death records,
etc. - are to be handled by Palestinians, but Israel is to be informed of "Every change in
its population registry, including, inter alia, any change in the place of residence of any
resident." Id. para. 4.
235. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 29, at 617. Emphasizing the local nature of the PA, as
defined in the IA, Palestinian postage stamps are to contain only the terms "Palestinian
Council" or "Palestinian Authority." Id. para. 2(a), at 618. The PLO is to arrange for
sending and receiving postal items between the Palestinian side and foreign countries
through commercial agreements with Postal Authorities of Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. Id.
para. 6(a). The PLO's status at the Universal Postal Union, however, is not to change Id.
para. 6(b).
236. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 36, at 620. Under the IA, the PA may construct its own
telecommunications network, although, in the interim, it will enter into a commercial
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transportation; 2 7 public works and housing; 238 and holy sites. 239 The
spheres of authority transferred to the PA, therefore, are primarily municipal functions. To the extent that they move beyond being local concerns - implicating regional resource allocation, infrastructure development, or international relations - the IA requires coordination with
Israel.
Accordingly, the IA places into the second category of functional jurisdiction - partial authority - those spheres involving the OPT as a
whole, as opposed to the local affairs of municipalities. For these functions, the IA requires cooperation between the PA and Israeli authorities in the OPT, establishing a Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (CAC) composed of an equal number of Palestinians
and Israelis and charged with addressing "matters arising with regard
to infrastructures, such as roads, water, and sewage systems, power
lines and telecommunications infrastructure, which require coordination according to [the] Agreement. '240 Like the territorial jurisdiction
provisions described above, the IA's assignment of partial functional jurisdiction to the PA in spheres related to general infrastructure prevents the Palestinians from establishing effective authority over the
OPT as a whole, limiting their power to the affairs of individual municipalities in the Territories. Indeed, since any significant construction
in Area C for any purpose can proceed only with Israeli approval, the
Palestinians' capacity to construct an independent infrastructure is severely constrained by the IA.
The IA's provisions concerning electricity reflect these tensions
well. The Agreement provides for the establishment of a Palestinian
Energy Authority (PEA), to which it assigns the authority "to issue licenses and to set rules, tariffs, and regulations in order to develop electricity systems." 24 1 It also establishes a Joint Electricity Subcommittee
to deal with "issues of mutual interest concerning electricity." 242 The
Palestinians, therefore, have jurisdiction over the administrative dimensions of electricity provision and have a forum within which to coordinate broader functions with the Israelis. The remaining details regarding the assignment of powers and responsibilities over electricity,
however, remain unresolved. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have
yet to agree on the scope of the Palestinian authority over electricity.
Indeed, the two sides have precisely opposite positions: the Palestinians
seek primary authority over the electrical grid in the entire West Bank
and construction rights throughout that territory but would agree to Is-

agreement with the Israeli telephone company (Bezeq). As in other spheres, however, the
PA must seek Israeli approval for any construction in Area C. Id. para. a(2).
237. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 37-38, at 622-23.
238. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 30, at 618.
239. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 32, at 619.
240. Id. Annex 3, art. 1, para. 1(c)(2), at 603.
241. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 10, para. 2 (merged version), at 607.
242. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 10, para. 8 (merged version), at 608.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:1

raeli operation and maintenance of electricity supply systems within
the Israeli settlements and military installations; the Israelis, conversely, seek to retain control over the OPT's electricity infrastructure
but would cede local, administrative authority to the Palestinians. 243 In
the absence of agreement, "the existing status quo in the sphere of elec244
tricity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged.
Since the status quo and the Israeli position are virtually indistinguishable, the prospects for expanded Palestinian authority in this
sphere appear limited. Thus, the infrastructure issues that strike closest to defining the future of the OPT generally and Palestinian self-rule
specifically remain largely unresolved, resulting in the perpetuation of
the status quo ante, i.e. Israeli occupation and control.
The Interim Agreement, moreover, prohibits the PA from assuming
any jurisdiction at all over functions that involve external relations.
Article 17 of the IA states, "[i]n accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the [Palestinian] Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip
territory as a single territorial unit, except for: (a) issues that will be
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis. 245 Although the Agreement acknowledges
the PLO's role as international representative of the Palestinian people
and permits it to "conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states
or international organizations for the benefit of the Council" in certain
spheres, including economic, cultural, scientific, and educational
agreements, 246 the Council itself is denied "powers and responsibilities
in the sphere of foreign relations." 247 It cannot establish embassies,
consulates or other types of foreign missions abroad or facilitate their
establishment in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 248 It also cannot contribute to the defense of the OPT's against "external threats. '249 Furthermore, under the IA, any involvement between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international organizations - even
for the approved purpose of carrying out cultural, scientific, or educa250
tional agreements - is not to be considered "foreign relations."
Through these provisions, the IA expressly disallows the PA from participating in the international process in any way that could influence
its international status.
The functional jurisdiction of the PA, therefore, is limited to an array of municipal powers and responsibilities. The IA explicitly prohibits the PA from engaging in external relations, except in relation to the
provision of basic services to the local population and the economic de243. These positions are represented in the "merged version" of Annex 3, Appendix 1,
Article 10 of the IA. Id. at 607-608.
244. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 10 (merged version), at 608.
245. Id. ch. 3, art. 17, para. 1(a), at 564.
246. Id. ch. 1, art. 9, para. 5(b), at 561.
247. Id. para. 5(a).
248. Id.
249. Id. ch. 1, art. 12, para. 1, at 562.
250. Id. ch. 1, art. 9, para. 5(c), at 561.
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velopment of the OPT. It also severely circumscribes the PA's role in
the management of OPT-wide infrastructures, establishing a system of
required coordination with the Israelis that leaves ultimate authority
over these issues to Israel. 251 Thus, although the IA makes repeated
reference to maintaining the territorial integrity of the OPT, the
agreement ultimately has more to do with local governance of the Palestinian population than with the development of Palestinian territorial
autonomy.
c. Personal Jurisdiction
The fact that the PA governs a population, rather than a territory,
is also apparent from its limited personal jurisdiction. Article 17 of the
IA states, "[t]he territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will
apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in
this Agreement. 252 According to the Agreement, Israel maintains exclusive personal jurisdiction over Israelis in all criminal matters, even
for offenses committed in areas under PA (i.e. Areas A and B).253 Israelis, moreover, will only come under the jurisdiction of Palestinian judicial authorities in civil matters when they explicitly consent in writing to that jurisdiction, when they maintain ongoing businesses in
territory under Palestinian authority, or when the subject matter of the
action is real property located in Palestinian territory. 254 The PA's
powers, therefore, extend only over the Palestinian population and
other non-Israelis within Palestinian jurisdiction.
2. Legitimacy
The Interim Agreement provides for the transfer of authority over
the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel
to the PA. As noted above, the terms of this transfer were determined
through a process of negotiation between Israel and the PLO. The DOP
and the IA consequently are neither unilateral enactments by the State
of Israel nor agreements between Israel and the Palestinian population
currently residing in the OPT. Rather, they are international agreements between the Government of Israel and the PLO, acting on behalf
of all Palestinian people. Thus, while the PA derives its authority in
the OPT from Israel, it derives its legitimacy, at least during the interim period, from its relationship to the PLO in its capacity as international representative of the Palestinian people. The legal and func251. While the Interim Agreement (IA) provides a three-tier process for the settlement
of disputes including, ultimately, their submission to arbitration, IA, ch. 3, art. 21, the
IA's arbitration clause is arguably pathological. Id. at 566. There is no indication regarding the arbitral forum or the applicable law. Submission to arbitration is entirely voluntary. The uselessness of the clause is demonstrated by the recent unsuccessful attempt by
Palestinian negotiators to have the dispute regarding the electricity infrastructure submitted to international arbitration.
252. Id. ch. 3, art. 17, para. 2(c), at 564.
253. Id. Annex 4, art. 1, para. 2, at 635.
254. Id. Annex 4, art. 3, para. 2, at 638.
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tional relationship between the PLO and the PA consequently bears
some review.
As discussed earlier in this essay, the international community
unanimously recognizes the Palestinians' status as a people and their
right to participate in the resolution of the question of Palestine. Most
States also recognize the Palestinians' right to national selfdetermination. To give substance to this recognition the international
community, including, since 1993, Israel and the United States, has
consented to the PLO's participation in the international process as the
representative of the Palestinian people. Because the PLO is recognized only as agent for the Palestinian people, its international legitimacy hinges upon international confidence that it represents the interests of the Palestinian people, in whom the rights to participation and
self-determination reside. The PLO, consequently, is bound to act in
accordance with the wishes of the Palestinian people, as a whole, not
simply that portion that resides in the OPT.
The decisions of the Palestine National Council (PNC) and the Central Committee, its subsidiary, provide the best indication of the extent
to which the agreements concluded between the PLO and the Government of Israel have elicited the approval of the Palestinian people. In
1974, the PNC "called for the establishment of an independent national
authority over any part of Palestine that may be liberated."25 5 The
Arab League ratified this approach during its Summit Conference in
Rabat in 1974, and that ratification was later cited as precedent supporting the establishment of the PA.256 More recently, the Central
257
Committee of the PNC voted on October 11, 1993 to ratify the DOP,
which was signed one month earlier by Yasser Arafat, acting on the
authority of the Executive Committee of the PLO.258 Since the DOP established the framework within which the ongoing PLO-Israel negotiations have proceeded, the PNC, by ratifying it, authorized the Executive
Committee of the PLO to conclude further agreements consistent with
its terms. 259 The PA, therefore, was established with the authorization
of the PLO and, by extension, of the Palestinian people.
The establishment of the PA, however, does not alter the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian people - either those living
within the OPT or those residing in other States. Although the PLO
Executive Committee played a significant role in governing the sections
255. NASSAR, supra note 57, at 63.
256. Id.

257. Israelis, Palestinians Laud PLO Ratification of Peace Accord, UPI, Oct. 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
258. See generally, Executive Committee, Statement on the Declaration of Principles,
Tunis, Sept. 12, 1993, THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at
143.
259. One PLO official in the United States suggests that these measures constitute a
delegation of authority to conduct negotiations from the PNC, where ultimate authority in
the PLO resides, to the Executive Committee and Chairman Arafat. Interview with
Klhalis A. Foutah, Deputy Chief Representative, Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestine National Authority, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 9, 1996).

1997

STALLED BETWEEN SEASONS

of the OPT under Palestinian administration during the transitional
period before the election of the Palestinian Council in January 1996, it
did so purely in a caretaker capacity until the Council was in a position
to assume the functions assigned to it by the DOP and IA. 260 Otherwise, the PLO and the PA have very different functions vis-a-vis the
Palestinian people. The PA, as discussed above, has largely municipal
authority over the affairs of Palestinians in the OPT. It lacks the legal
competence to make any broader decisions regarding the Palestinian
people living outside the OPT or even regarding the ultimate status of
Palestinians in the OPT. These functions remain the province of the
PLO, which, as discussed in the next section, continues to serve as the
representative of the Palestinian people in negotiations with Israel and
in other international contexts.
Conversely, the PLO does not have legal authority over decisions of
the PA that relate to local governance of the Palestinians in the OPT.
The Interim Agreement, in its provisions regarding Palestinian Council
elections, states, "[i]n order that the Palestinian people of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free, and general elections will be held for the
Council and (the President) of the Executive Authority of the Council ... ,"261 This provision emphasizes that the Council is to represent
the interests of the "Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip," who, through the Council, will "govern themselves." Thus, only
their elected leaders in the OPT have the authority to make decisions
included in the Council's functional jurisdiction.
This interpretation is supported by the Palestinian Election Law,
which was issued by the PA in early December 1995. Article 12 of the
Election Law requires members of the Palestine National Council (the
PLO's legislative organ) who are seeking office in the PA Palestinian
Council not only to reside within the OPT, but also to transfer their
registration with any external constituencies to one of the interior constituencies in the OPT, thereby preventing any one person from serving
both interior and exterior constituencies.2 62 The Election Law thereby
formalizes the distinction between the interests of Palestinians residing
in the OPT and those who remain in diaspora and emphasizes the local
260. During the transitional period before the Council's election, the territories under
Palestinian self-rule (the Gaza Strip, excluding Israeli settlements and military installations, and beginning with Jericho, several of the population centers in the West Bank)
were governed by a Palestinian Council of National Authority, which was established
pursuant to a Basic Law approved by the Central Committee of the PNC. Draft Basic
Law for the National Authority During the Transitional Period, art. 58(1) (June 1994).
The Council acted in a caretaker capacity during the transitional period and was "generally ...responsible for the government and administration of the affairs of the country."
Id. art. 59. The Basic Law made the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO
the "President" of the Council, id. art. 50, and provided for the appointment of other
Council members by the PLO Executive Committee, id. art. 58(1). The Council's term
ended upon the election of the Palestinian Council provided for by the Interim Agreement.
261. Interim Agreement, ch. 1, art. 2, para. 1, 36 I.L.M. 551, 559.
262. The Palestine National Authority, Palestinian Election Law, art. 12, para. 7 in
Palestine Report, Special Supplement, Jan. 12, 1996.
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character of representation in the Palestinian Council.
It is worth mentioning, however, that although the PLO and the PA
are legally and functionally divided, they are intrinsically intertwined:
the PLO negotiated the creation of the PA; the two bodies share a
leader (President/Chairman Arafat) and are dominated by the same po263
litical party (Fatah);
and at least six of the elected members of the
Palestinian Council also hold positions in the Palestine National Council. 264 A PLO official in the United States has suggested that this overlap helps to ensure consistency between PLO and PA positions and
more fluid coordination of their activities. 265 This arrangement has,
however, elicited severe criticism with many Palestinians arguing that.
the administration of Yasser Arafat has become unresponsive to the
needs of Palestinians in diaspora. 266 Critics also have expressed concern that the establishment of the PA has marginalized the PLO's political bodies and has relegated the PLO to the role of international
"wheeler-dealer" on behalf of the PA. 2 67
In view of these concerns, it is important to emphasize that while
the PA's authority over the affairs of Palestinians in the OPT is based
upon the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Government
of Israel, its legitimacy emerges from the Palestinian people. Its external legitimacy derives from the role that the PLO, as international representative of the Palestinian people, played in negotiating and approving its establishment, and its internal legitimacy arises from the
participation of the Palestinian population in the OPT in the election of
268
the Palestinian Council.
3. International Participation
The PA can participate in the international process only through
the PLO. As discussed above, the Interim Agreement expressly prohibits the PA itself, from assuming powers and responsibilities in the

263. Candidates affiliated with Fatah won 76% of the votes in the January elections
for the Palestinian Council. Ghada Karmi, What Role for the PalestinianDiasporaAfter
Oslo?, in PALESTINIAN ELECTION AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE: A SPECIAL REPORT 98

(The Center for Policy Analysis in Palestine, ed. 1996).
264. The following Palestinian Council members are PNC members: Hakam Bal'awi
(Tulkarem District); Dawood El-Zeir (Bethlehem District); Sharif Ali Hussein Mash'al'Abbas Zaki (Hebron District); Nabil 'Amr (Hebron District); Abdul Jawad Saleh (Ramallah
District); Azmi E1-Shuai'bi (Ramallah District).
265. Foutah Interview, supra note 259. Interestingly, Mr. Foutah's business card
identifies him as the Chief Representative in the United States of both the PLO and PA,
an arrangement that would seem to be precluded by the terms of the Interim Agreement.
266. See Karmi, supra note 263, at 11 (citing Arabic press report that eighty thousand
Palestinian refugees signed petition denouncing Palestinian Council elections because
Palestinians outside of OPT were excluded from voting).
267. Id. at 12-13.
268. The elections for Palestinian Council members yielded an extremely high overall
turnout rate of 79% of registered voters, despite the attempted boycott of the elections by
opposition parties. Salma A. Shawa, The PalestinianElections: A Strong Start Into an
UncertainFuture, WASH. RPT. ON MIDDLE EAST, Apr. 1996, at 23.
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sphere of foreign relations. It does, however, permit the PLO to "conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council" in the spheres of economic,
social, and technical development. 269 As discussed earlier in this essay,
the PLO has established relationships with and participated in the proceedings of a variety of international organizations. Under the terms of
the IA, the PLO may work with these organizations to address the specific problems and needs of the Palestinians in the OPT. In this respect,
the PLO can participate more substantively in the international process
than it could before its link to the Palestinian population in the OPT
was formalized by the DOP.
The IA appears, however, to limit the extent to which the PLO may
use this broadened participation as a basis for altering its international
status during the interim period. This issue emerges in the IA's terms
regarding the provision of postal services to the OPT's population. The
Agreement states, "[w]ithout derogating from the generality of paragraph 5 of Article IX of this Agreement (Foreign Relations), the status
of the Palestinian side to this Agreement in the Universal Postal Union
(UPU) will remain as it is at present, and the Palestinian side will not
be party to any action to alter or change its status."270 In the context of
the Agreement, the "Palestinian side" refers to the PLO, which is not a
member of the UPU. The provision, therefore, precludes the PLO from
seeking membership in the UPU as a "sovereign state," 27 1 despite the
UPU's traditionally liberal membership policy. 27 2 Although the Interim
Agreement does not address this issue with regard to other organizations, it is indicative of the likely reaction from Israel to PLO attempts
to alter its status in other international organizations. Since Israel will
continue to control the admission of foreign visitors to the OPT
throughout the Interim Period, 273 it will be in a position to stifle PLO
efforts that it views as possibly prejudicing the outcome of final status
negotiations.
4. Conclusion
The majority of the States in the international system have recognized that the Palestinian people form a nation and are entitled freely
to determine their political status. In order to facilitate vindication of
that right, the international community has consented to the participa269. Interim Agreement, ch. 1, art. 9, para. 5(b), 36 I.L.M. 551, 561.
270. Id. Annex 3, app. 1, art. 29, para. 6(b), at 618.
271. "Article 3(1) of the Constitution of the UPU prescribes that 'any sovereign state
may apply for admission as a member."' W. MICHAEL REISMAN, PUERTO Rico AND THE
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN ASSOCIATION 79 (1975).

272. According to Michael Reisman, the gates to membership in the UPU have been
opened wide," with little discussion of the be attributes of sovereignty. As he notes,
"Membership in the UPU] includes the Netherland Antilles wazzu and Surinam, Portuguese provinces in West Africa, East Africa, Asia, and Oceania, Liechtenstein, Monaco,
the Vatican, San Marino, and so on. With such a liberal membership policy, there has
been no need for the development of associate status." Id.
273. Interim Agreement, Annex 1, 36 I.L.M. 551, 569.
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tion of the Palestinian people in the international process through their
international representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The PLO, however, does not govern the Palestinian people; rather, it
exists to secure for them the opportunity to govern themselves, and its
legitimacy and international status arise from that role. Neither the
establishment of the symbolic State in 1988 nor the creation of the PA
in 1994 legally altered the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian people: the 1988 Declaration of Independence simply marked an
official redefinition of Palestinian national aspirations - a retroactive
acceptance of the two-state solution embodied in the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan; and the PA was established as a government of limited
authority to serve the local needs of the Palestinians residing in the
OPT during the interim period and to create a practical foundation for
some broader form of self-government.
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINE UNDER INTERIM
SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Thus, Palestine at present is a people, a territory, a liberation organization with a legal status as something more than a liberation organization, a State with a legal status as something less than a State,
and an Interim Authority of rather limited authority. But is Palestine
more than the sum of its parts? Can the public bodies established to
represent and liberate the people and territory of Palestine be fused
into an entity with a legal status of its own? In this section, I undertake to situate Palestinian public bodies within the normative framework governing the exercise of self-determination. Ultimately, I will
argue that, while the legal and functional separation of the PLO and
the PA has precluded Palestine from acquiring an international legal
status independent of those bodies, that separation also has served to
preserve the independence of the PLO as the international representative of the Palestinian people, which is a necessary precondition for its
role in facilitating the legal exercise of Palestinian self-determination.
A. The Exercise of Self-Determination
Modern international law has developed relatively defined standards to govern the legal exercise of self-determination. As Crawford
notes, "[i]t is a peculiarity of this area of practice that it is possible to be
more certain about the 'consequences' of self-determination than about
the criteria for the territories to which the principle is regarded as applying." 274 The goal articulated by the U.N. Charter for non-selfgoverning territories is the eventual attainment of "a full measure of
self-government." 275 The General Assembly has interpreted the Charter
to permit three alternatives:
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full
274. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 91-92.
275. U.N. Charter, art. 73.
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measure of self-government by[:]
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
276
(c) Integration with an independent State.

Thus, although self-government most frequently has taken the
277
"[m]any fedform of full independence from the administering State,
erations, real unions, personal unions and associations are treated with
278
Indeed, for entiequanimity by the international decision process.
ties too small or underdeveloped to be economically or politically viable
as independent States, association or integration with another State
can provide the self-determining population with heightened security
and broader access to other markets, while at the same time permitting
the associate to maintain a discrete political identity and to participate
279
in potentially significant ways in the international process.
Association and integration have taken a variety of forms in the international system, providing populations with different levels of independence from metropolitan States. The formal status of association
maintains both parties' legal status of statehood but involves "the significant subordination of and delegations of competence by one of the
parties (the associate) to the other (the principal)." 280 Thus, to cite one
example, although Puerto Rico maintains a relationship of association
with the United States - it has delegated significant foreign affairs
powers to the United States, and its citizens hold United States passports - it remains a sovereign State and legally may terminate the association if its population so desires. Even integration within another
State need not entirely extinguish the autonomy and international personality of the subordinate political entity. For instance, although
Greenland was integrated within the realm of Denmark in 1952, the
territory retains a significant degree of autonomy under Home Rule ar28 2
rangements, 28 1 and it maintains a limited international personality.

276. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 24, at Annex, Principle VI; Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra note 9, at 124. The International Court of Justice endorsed the
General Assembly's interpretation in the Western Sahara Case. Western Sahara Case,
1975 I.C.J. 12, 32.
277. As Crawford notes, "[o]f approximately 100 Chapter XI territories in the period
1945-78, 59 achieved joint or separate independence (this includes Grenada, Surinam,
and Singapore, which had a previous status of self government)." CRAWFORD, supra note
8, at 369 n.60.
278. REISMAN, supra note 271, at 11.
279. See generally id. at 19-20, 51-103; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 370-77.
280. REISMAN, supra note 271, at 10. Neither the delegation of its foreign affairs competence nor the existence of common trade agreements, common currency, or common
citizenship have deemed to extinguish the international personality of an associate. Id. at
17.
281. Under the Greenland Home Rule Act, Greenland is defined as a "distinct commuNil LANTE WALLACE-BRUCE, CLAIMS To
nity within the Kingdom of Denmark."
STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1994) (quoting the Greenland Home Rule Act
art. 1). Accordingly, Greenland has a legislature and executive with authority in the areas of "taxation, education, culture, church affairs, production and export, supplies and
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Similarly, while China resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong in
1997, the Joint Declaration concluded between China and the United
Kingdom assures that Hong Kong will enjoy "a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs." 283 These and many other
precedents show that a territory may preserve limited international
personality and autonomy even in the context of association or integration with another State.
Where the right of self-determination is involved, however, the legal inquiry in such cases does not end with a declaration that a selfdetermining population has opted for association or integration. As
Professor Michael Reisman notes, "[t]he lawfulness of particular associations is determined by content and not by form." 28 4 Article One of
the International Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights declares, "[a]ll peoples have the right to selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." 285 Apparent from the Covenants' definition of selfdetermination is that the right, if nothing else, revolves around freedom
- the freedom of a people to define their own political status and to determine for themselves the nature of their relationships with other
members of the international system. That is not to say, of course, that
that freedom is absolute. In a world system characterized by both interdependency and at least de facto inequality, the freedom of every
community is constrained by myriad political and economic factors.
Nevertheless, the right to self-determination would be rendered an
empty promise if the choice among types of self-government were imposed upon, rather than selected by, the concerned population. Interna-

transport, technology, telecommunications and housing." Id. at 191-92. The areas excluded from Greenland's home rule authority are external relations, financial, monetary
and currency policy, defense, the administration of justice and police, and constitutional,
contract, inheritance, and family law. Id. at 192.
282. Greenland is affiliated with the European Community as an Overseas Territory;
it also sends its own delegation to the Nordic Council, where it is treated as an independent nation, and it is a member of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, which has observer
status at the United Nations. Id. at 192-93. Moreover, the Greenland Home Rule Act requires that treaties affecting the interests of Greenland be referred to home rule authorities before they are concluded by Denmark. Id. at 193.
283. Id. at 203-04. Hong Kong nevertheless will continue to participate, albeit to a
limited degree, in the international arena. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China stipulates that, under the name
Hong Kong, China, the territory may establish and maintain diplomatic relations and
conclude agreements in the fields of economics, trade, financial, monetary, shipping,
communications, tourism, culture, and sports. Id. at 204-05. Since Hong Kong has not
been regarded as a self-determination unit, however, its disposition is not directly relevant to the question of Palestine.
284. REISMAN, supra note 271, at 11.
285. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 5; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 173 (emphasis added).
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tional practice, accordingly, has been to strive to assure that selfgovernment has been achieved through the free choice of the selfdetermining people.
One way in which the international community has evaluated the
integrity of an exercise of self-determination is by examining popular
support for the decision. A choice of association or integration has elicited particular scrutiny, since there is a greater possibility that these
forms of self-determination resulted from coercion by a metropolitan
28 6
State, rather than from the free choice of the concerned population.
Principle VII(a) of the Annex to U.N. General Assembly Resolution
1541 (XV) states, "[f]ree association should be the result of a free and
voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed
through informed and democratic processes." 28 7 As Professor Reisman
points out, the consent of the elite or effective leader no longer suffices
to ratify the association: "[iun contemporary practice, the demand for
plebiscite or some other reliable consultation of popular will indicates
that dispositions of territorial communities can be effected lawfully only
with the free and informed consent of the members of that community."288 Resolution 1541 is even more explicit in its provisions regarding integration, requiring that integration be "the result of the freely
expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of
the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through
informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on
universal adult suffrage." 289 Thus, the international community has
come to require objective evidence of popular support among a selfdetermining population for a decision to associate with or be incorporated within another State.
This principle has also been applied, at least on one occasion, in the
context of independence. The principle of self-determination requires
not only that a territory be self-governing, but also that the people of
that territory be self-governing. The international community consequently has been unwilling to recognize the independence of territories
whose population effectively has been denied the opportunity to exercise self-determination by the transfer of power to an unsupported or
unrepresentative government. 290 While, as Crawford points out, "selfdetermination does not necessarily involve the establishment of a democracy based on the principle of 'one vote, one value,' and the administering authority has a measure of discretion in determining the persons
in the territory to whom the grant of authority will be made," 29 1 the international community has required that authority be transferred to a
government possessing the support of a territory's general popula286. See CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 370, 373.
287. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supranote 12, at Annex, Principle VII(a).
288. Reisman, supra note 271, at 12, quoting STEPHANSKY, PUERTO RICO IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN 95 (T. Szulc. ed. 1971).

289. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supranote 12, at Annex, Principle IX(b).
290. See DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 97-98 (1987) (discussing
non-recognition of white minority government of Rhodesia).
291. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 219.
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The United Nations also has sought to confirm the voluntary consent of a population to an association by scrutinizing the terms of the
agreement between the metropolitan and associated States. It has required for instance that there be procedures in place that permit the
Associate to terminate the association as easily as the metropolitan
State and that demonstrate that the association is "a continued expression of the right of self-determination of the people of the Associated
293
State."
Because of concern about the voluntariness of putative exercises of
self-determination, international law requires special scrutiny when a
territory's status changes while it is under belligerent occupation. The
Fourth Geneva Convention provides:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived,
in any case or in any matter whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention by any change introduces, as the result of the occupation of
a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor
by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied
territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. 294
There is a presumption that a State that comes into being under
belligerent occupation is a puppet State, and, as a result, it should not
be recognized as independent by other States. 295 The international
norm against the recognition of puppet states traditionally has been defined in terms of state sovereignty: a puppet state is an organ of the occupant State and, therefore, is subordinate to its legal order; since a
sovereign State is subordinate only to international law, a puppet state
cannot be recognized as sovereign. 296 While this argument need not be
framed with reference to self-determination, the norm against recognition of puppet States suggests that the creation of a puppet State is not
a valid exercise of self-determination since Principle VI of General Assembly Resolution 1541 permits only "[e]mergence as a sovereign independent State." An occupant State, therefore, may not avoid its legal
obligations to the population of an occupied territory simply by obscuring its control through the creation of a puppet State. Indeed, Marek
suggests that the presumption that a State or government established
during a belligerent occupation is of a puppet character can "only be re-

292. Id. at 220 (citing the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly's insistence
that the United Kingdom not transfer power to the white minority government of Rhodesia and, rather, "promote the country's attainment of independence in accordance with the
aspirations of the majority of the population.").
293. Id. at 376.
294. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. 318.
295. See KRYSTYNA MAREK, AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 113 (1968).
296. See id. at 113-14.
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butted after the liberation of the territory.

'297

In sum, therefore, international law requires that selfdetermination be exercised with regard for the free will of the selfdetermining population. The establishment of statehood is not the only
legitimate outcome: the international community has shown tolerance
for decisions by self-determining populations to associate with or integrate within another State, rather than to establish complete independence. These alternative outcomes have, however, elicited greater scrutiny by the international community, particularly when, as in cases of
military occupation, there is great potential that an ostensible exercise
of self-determination resulted from coercion rather than free choice.
B. The Legal Status of Palestine
International law recognizes the participation of a variety of types
of actors in the international process. Under traditional doctrine, states
were the only recognized international participants. 29 8 0ver the course
of the twentieth century, however, international law has come to recognize the participation of other, non-state entities. 299
McDougal,
Laswell, and Reisman define a participant in the international constitutive process as "an individual or an entity which has at least minimum
access to the process of authority in the sense that it can make claims
or be subjected to claims."30 0 As their definition suggests, different
types of international actors participate in different capacities, the
breadth of their participation determined by their relations with other
actors in the international system. Accordingly, "an international person need not possess all the international rights, duties, and powers
normally possessed by states. Some states only possess some of those
rights and duties; they are therefore only in those limited respects subjects of international law and thus only possess limited international
personality." 3' 0 1 Thus, although States remain preeminent within the
international process, it is no longer their exclusive province.
Under prevailing international legal standards, Palestine is not a
State. Although the PLO and the PA each fulfill aspects of the objective
criteria for statehood at least as well as some recognized States, the two
bodies do not, together, form a unit independent and unified enough to
constitute a State. The PLO remains the independent voice and international representative of the Palestinian people, but it lacks direct
authority over the population and territory of Palestine. Conversely,
while the PA directly governs segments of the OPT, its authority is subordinated to Israel's, and it is prohibited by the DOP and subsequent
297. Id.
298. See Myres McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Processof Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUc. 253, 262 & n.8 (1967); J.D. van der Vyver, StatehoodIn International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9, 12 (1991).
299. See Suy, supra note 148, at 84, 100-01.
300. McDougal, supra note 298, at 262.
301. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW ch.2, sec. 33 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955).
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agreements from independently participating in international affairs.
The relationship between the PA and the PLO consequently may best
be characterized as a variation on association, although neither entity
is a sovereign State. Ultimately, while this arrangement does not itself
represent a fulfillment of the Palestinian right to self-determination, it
leaves open the possibility for the free exercise of self-determination in
the future.
1. Statehood
The creation of States is a matter appraised by international law.
Indeed, the idea that an entity's international legal status could be
subject to definition by another State's municipal law repudiates one of
the central premises of modern international law: the sovereign equality of States. Since no one State legally may impose its municipal order
upon another, some higher order must prevail over interstate relations.
As Marek explains, "[s]ince they break the framework of municipal law,
the birth, extinction, and transformation of States can be made subject
of a legal inquiry only by reference to a legal order which is both higher
than State law and yet belongs to the same system of norms ...., 302
Thus, while "[i]nternational law does not 'create' States, just as a State
does not 'create' individuals ... [i]t is international law and international law alone which provides the legal evaluation of the process, determines whether the entity is in fact a State, delimits its competences
and decides when it ceases to exist."303 Since an entity's participation
in the international system is defined by its perceived status among
other international actors, however, there has been some controversy
regarding the role that recognition plays in conferring the legal status
of Statehood on aspirant communities.
Two predominant views have emerged regarding this issue: the declaratory approach and the constitutive approach. The orthodox constitutive approach holds, generally, that an entity legally becomes a State
when other international actors recognize it to be one, the act of recognition being constitutive of a new State's legal status. According to Lauterpacht, this view is based upon a Hegelian vision of international law
"as a loose 'law of co-ordination' based on agreement as distinguished
from the overriding command of a superior rule of law." 304 States,
within this perspective, exist only in relation to one another, their
status emerging from their relationships, not on the basis of objective
legal criteria. Proponents of the declaratory view argue that this relativist dimension of the constitutive approach is "destructive of the very
notion of an international community." 305 They maintain that an entity
becomes a State when it fulfills the legal criteria for statehood and that,

302. MAREK, supra note 295, at 2.
303. Id.
304. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1947).

305. MAREK, supra note 295, at 132, quoting TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF RECOGNITION 42 (L.C. Green ed., 1951).
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therefore, recognition by other states is simply declaratory of an existing fact. As Chen summarizes:
The fact that States cannot have the same faculty for appreciating the
fact of the fulfillment of [the] requirements [for statehood] is no reason
for denying that there is an objective point of time at which such fulfillment takes place. Third States may be unable or unwilling to accannot alter it to suit their ignoknowledge this fact, but they certainly
30 6
rance, caprice, or self-interest.
Lauterpacht attempts to reconcile the declaratory and constitutive
approaches by suggesting that while recognition is "declaratory of
facts," it is "constitutive of rights." He reasons, "[a] State may exist as a
physical fact. But it is a physical fact which is of no relevance for the
commencement of particular international rights and duties until by
the sphere of
recognition - and nothing else - it has been lifted into
30 7
law, until by recognition it has become a juridical fact."
An evaluation of the relative merits of each of these approaches is
beyond the scope of this essay. It suffices to note that an entity's claim
to Statehood may be evaluated either on the basis of objective legal criteria or in light of the degree of recognition it has received by the international community. As discussed below, Palestine has yet to achieve
statehood within either framework.
2. The Declaratory Approach and the Montevideo Convention
Criteria for Statehood
The declaratory view of recognition, as noted above, holds that an
entity becomes a State when it fulfills the internationally accepted criteria for statehood.308 The Montevideo Convention of 1933 established
four criteria for evaluating an entity's claim to statehood. The entity is
required to possess: "(a) permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other
states."309 The requirement of independence is also frequently appended to the Montevideo criteria. 310 Although the Montevideo Convention technically binds only the parties to it, its criteria for statehood,
with minor variations, have been widely accepted as authoritative by
3 11
international jurists.
Although the analysis below addresses each of the criteria indi306. CHEN, supranote 305, at 44-45.
307. LAUTERPACHT, supranote 303, at 75.
308. These criteria are also relevant to Lauterpacht's view of recognition insofar as he
recommends that States base their decisions about whether to recognize a nascent State
on the applicable legal criteria, rather than political concerns. Id. at 55.
309. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165 U.N.T.S. 19
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
310. See generally MAREK, supra note 295 at 162-68.
311. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 31-34; WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at
51. Cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 34 (replacing the requirement of capacity to enter
into foreign relations with the requirement of sovereignty).
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vidually, it is important to note, as an initial matter, that they cannot
be applied piecemeal. Marek summarizes prevailing opinion as follows:
"[tihere is a State in the international law sense, when there is an independent legal order, effectively valid throughout a defined territory
with regard to a defined population."' 312 Similarly, Oppenheim states,
"[a] state proper is in existence when a people is settled in a territory
under its own sovereign government." 313 As these jurists' opinions suggest, the Montevideo criteria relate to and find definition in one another. A putative state, therefore, must possess a government that, itself, governs a population within a specified territory and that, itself,
has the capacity to enter into foreign relations. While Palestine fulfills
aspects of each of the Montevideo criteria, it continues to lack a full
measure of independence, which synthesizes and gives substance to the
other criteria for statehood.
a. Defined Territory
The international community has adopted an exceptionally flexible
construction of the "defined territory" criterion for statehood. In order
to qualify for statehood, an entity's territory need not exceed a minimum size. 314 It also need not be "coherent... or conform to any particular form." 315 Finally, the entity seeking statehood need not have
perfectly-delimited territorial boundaries. This standard was articulated in a well-known decision of the Polish-German Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal:
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of boundaries, one
cannot go so far as to maintain that as long as this delimitation has not
been legally effected, the state in question cannot be considered as

having any territory whatsoever... In order to say that a state exists ... it is enough that this territory has a sufficient consistency, even

312. MAREK, supra note 295, at 162 (emphasis added). The following statement by
U.S. President Grant, cited by Marek as indicative of state practice regarding the conditions for statehood, also draws attention to the relationship between the criteria:
[There must be a people occupying a known territory, united under some
known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject
thereto, in which the functions of government are administered by usual
methods, competent to mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford
remedies for public and for private wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations and capable of performing the corresponding
international duties resultingfrom its acquisitionof the rights of sovereignty.
A power should exist complete in its organization, ready to take and able to
maintain its place among the nations of the earth.
Marek, supra note 295, at 165, quoting J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
107-08 (1906).
313. OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, § 34 (emphasis added).
314. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 36 (stating that Tuvala, Malta, Nauru, Liechtenstein
and Seychelles -ranging in size from 26 sq. km. to 170 sq. km.-have been all recognized
as meeting the defined territory requirement). WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 51.
315. WALLAcE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 38 (noting that the international community
recognizes states, such as the United States and Tanzania, comprised of non-contiguous
territory).
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though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited, and that
the state actually exercises independent public authority over that ter316
ritory.

As the Tribunal made clear, the defined-territory criterion does not
require the legal demarcation of a state's boundaries. Indeed, the international community has on several occasions extended recognition to
states whose territorial borders remained in dispute. 317 What appears
central, instead, is the putative state's exercise of independent govern38
mental authority over a territory. 1
It is in that last respect that Palestine, as presently constituted,
fails to meet the defined territory criterion. One commentator has suggested that Palestine is not a defined territory because "[wihat territory
is Palestine remains the source of bitter conflict."3 19 However, that
analysis seems to ignore the traditionally flexible interpretation of the
defined territory criterion. What territory is Palestine, after all, is no
greater a source of conflict than what territory is Israel. 320 Moreover,
the PLO has defined very specific territorial goals for a State of Palestine - the West Bank and Gaza Strip 321 - and a substantial portion of
316. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 52 (quoting Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v.
Polish State, (1929) 5 A.D. No. 5, 14-15). See also MAREK, supra note 295, at 163 ("It may
happen that, in special circumstances, international law will provisionally accept, as its
subject, a community with only a rough delimitation of its territorial and personal spheres
."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 201 cmt. b ("An entity
may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have not been
finally settled, if one or more of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is
claimed by another state.").
317. See, e.g., Monastery of St. Naoum Case, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 9, at 10 (granting Albania international recognition and induction into League of Nations despite dispute over Serbo-Albanian); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 20).
318. See CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 40 ("The only requirement is that the State must
consist of a certain coherent territory effectively governed-a formula which demonstrates
that the requirement of territory is rather a constituent of government and independence
than a separate criterion of its own.").
319. Kathryn M. McKinney, Comment, The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLODeclaration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATLE U. L. REV. 93, 95
(1994).
320. Indeed, recognition of Israel was urged by the United States despite the controversy regarding its borders. WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 53 (quoting Jessup, U.S.
Representative to the Security Council, advocating admission of Israel to the U.N., U.N.
SCOR, 383rd Mtg, Supp. No. 128, at 9-12, (1948):
One does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject [definition
of a state in international law] any insistence that the territory of a state
must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers. .. The formulae in the classic
treatises somewhat vary, one from the others, but both reason and history
demonstrate that the concept of territory does not necessarily include precise
delimitations of the boundaries of that territory. The reason for the rule that
one of the necessary attributes of a state is that it shall possess territory is
that one cannot contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit. Historically, the concept is one of insistence that there must be some position of the
earth's surface which its people inhabit and over which its government exercises authority.'
321. See supratext accompanying notes 179-180 (discussing Palestinian Declaration of
Independence).
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the international community recognizes the legitimacy of those territorial aspirations.3 22 Although the precise boundaries of such a state
have yet to be precisely delimited, that fact, as noted above, has never
been regarded as a barrier to meeting the "defined territory" requirement. Thus, ongoing controversy regarding the proper boundaries of
Palestine is not an impediment to the Palestinian claim to statehood.
What is an impediment is the fact that a Palestinian government
does not yet exercise independent authority over a defined territory. As
discussed above, agreements between Israel and the PLO severely limit
the territorial, functional, and personal jurisdiction of the PA. While
the PA has significant municipal authority over areas of the OPT, it
does not possess sovereignty over them in any practical sense. Israel
retains authority to review all legislation governing the administration
of the territories, it has personal jurisdiction over all Israelis in the territories, it exercises control over most aspects of economic development
and security in the territories, and it continues to regulate movement
between the Palestinian administrative enclaves. As a result, it cannot
be said that a Palestinian government exercises independent authority
over any territory at all.
b. Permanent Population
International jurists also have construed broadly the Convention's
permanent population requirement. According to Wallace-Bruce, the
criterion "simply requires that there must be people identifying themselves with the territory no matter how small or large the population
might be." 323 Oppenheim provides a somewhat different interpretation,
defining a "people" as "an aggregate of individuals who live together as a
community, though they may belong to different races or creeds or cultures, or be of different colour."3 24 His definition suggests that a putative state's population not only must form a national community, but
also must live together as one. Combining these two interpretations, a
state's population should (1) identify themselves with a territory and (2)
live together as a community.
The Palestinian population meets both criteria. Palestinians not
only identify with the territory of Palestine, they define themselves in
terms of it.325 Although a large segment of the Palestinian population,
as defined by the PLO Covenant, is dispersed across the globe, the existence of Palestinian refugees does not, as some have suggested,3 26 defeat their claim to constitute a permanent population. Palestinians live
together as a community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where they
form the vast majority of the population. The fact that members of

322. See G.A. Res. 48/158D, supra note 100.
323. WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 53. In 1984, thirty-six United Nations member States had populations of less than one million. DUGARD, supra note 290 at 71.
324. OPPENHEIM, supra note 301, at sec. 34 (emphasis added).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 117-124.

326. McKinney, supra note 319, at 96.
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their national community reside elsewhere and may, if circumstances
permit, return to Palestine at a later date is irrelevant to Palestine's viability as a State. No doubt millions of people in the world may claim
citizenship in countries in which they do not presently reside; their
residence elsewhere does not, however, extinguish those states' claims
to possessing a permanent population. The Palestinian population in
the OPT, therefore, constitute Palestine's permanent population.
c. Government
Although there has been some movement toward making respect
for the rights of citizens a requirement for statehood, 27 the government
criterion does not require that a state adhere to a particular form of
government. The international community has recognized states with
myriad forms of government, from people's republics to constitutional
monarchies to theocracies.3 28 Rather, the government3 29 criterion can
be reduced to the elements of effectiveness and legal title. As Crawford
observes, "[tihe point about 'government' is that it has two aspects: the
actual exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that
authority."330 A government's effectiveness - or "actual exercise of
authority" - refers to its structural coherence and its general capacity
to maintain law and order within a territory. An examination of state
practice with regard to this element, however, reveals little in the way
of standards. States have recognized governments, such as the former
Belgian Congo (Zaire), that possessed only the most tenuous grasp of
authority. 331 The second element, legal title, refers to the government's
exclusive legal right under international law to govern a territory. 332
This right may have been granted by the former sovereign of the territory 33 3 or recognized in accordance with the principle of selfdetermination. Therefore, the government criterion possesses both factual and legal dimensions.

327. See DUGARD, supra note 290, at 97-98 (discussing developing norm of nonrecognition of regimes based upon systematic denial of population's civil and political
rights); van der Vyver, supra note 298, at 14.
328. WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 54.

329. MAREK, supra note 295, at 162. Marek uses the term "legal order" instead of government.
330. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 44.
331. Crawford describes the situation in the Belgian Congo when recognition was
granted to it in 1960 as follows:
No effective preparations had been made; the new government was bankrupt, divided, and in practice hardly able to control even the capital. Belgian
and other troops intervened, shortly after independence, under claim of humanitarian intervention; and extensive Unites States financial and military
assistance became necessary almost immediately. Among the tasks of the
United nations force was, or came to be, the suppression of secession in Katanga, the richest Congolese province. Anything less like effective government it would be hard to imagine.
Id. at 43.
332. Id. at 44.
333. Id.
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State practice appears to indicate, however, that a strong legal title
can compensate for a lack of effectiveness and, conversely, that a weak
legal title requires more complete effectiveness. 334 According to Crawford, it is thi, inverse relationship that explains the international community's willingness to grant early recognition to the Belgian Congo de33 5
It
spite its government's relative lack of control over the country.
similarly explains the almost universal non-recognition of the government of Rhodesia, which assumed power in contravention of the principle of self-determination, even though the Rhodesian government main336
tained effective control over the country.
The long-standing dispute over the legal title to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip has been the focus of a large body of scholarly literature. An
appraisal of that debate is beyond the scope of this essay. Regardless of
the strength of the Palestinians' general claim of right to selfgovernment, however, the interim character and extraordinarily limited
powers of the PA make it impossible to characterize that body as the
"effective government" of the OPT. The PA's authority, after all, is conferred on it by the agreements reached between Israel and the PLO, not
by international law. While an independently constituted Palestinian
government conceivably could assert a legitimate claim to being the "effective government" of Palestine without having established full control
over the territory it claims, the PA is not such a government. Since the
PLO at present exercises authority in the OPT only through its relationship to the PA, its effectiveness is similarly limited. Palestine
therefore lacks an effective government.
d. Capacity to enter into foreign relations.
A state's capacity to enter into foreign relations is evaluated in
terms of its legal competence to participate in the international process
and to carry its international obligations into effect on the domestic
level. The economic 337 and political 338 factors that define the breadth of
its international activity are not relevant to the determination. As
Crawford explains, the foreign relations requirement is essentially a
synthesis of the government and independence criteria: "[c]apacity or
competence... depends partly on the power of internal government of a
territory, without which international obligations may not be carried
into effect, and partly on the entity concerned being separate for the
purpose of such relations so that no other entity carries out and accepts

334. MAREK, supra note 295, at 102.
335. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 44.
336. See DUGARD, supra note 290, at 97-98.
337. "Capacity" here refers to a state's legal competence, not its economic or monetary
situation. WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 56-57 (discussing a significant number of
countries that lack economic capacity to participate fully in the international system but
are nevertheless recognized as states).
338. See id. at 55-56 ("'Capacity' in this context refers to legal competency. Once that
competency exists, it is left to the discretion of the entity to choose which international
persons it desires to engage in relations with.").
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responsibility for them."3 39 The international recognition of Liechtenstein's statehood 340 illustrates the centrality of independence to the foreign relations criterion: while Liechtenstein has delegated the conduct
of its foreign relations to Switzerland, it remains politically independent, its foreign relations "carried out by Switzerland only from case to
case and inasmuch as they are the subject of a special instruction of the
Government of the Principality."3 41 Thus, the actual capacity to participate in the international process is subordinate to independence,
which is itself the legal basis for a state's foreign relations activity. Accordingly, while independent states participate more fully than other
types of entities, their participation is "not a criterion, but rather a consequence, of statehood, and one which depends on the status and situa3 42
tion of particular states."
Although the PLO has demonstrated its capacity to enter into foreign relations on behalf of the Palestinian people, the legal and functional separation of the PLO and the PA prevent the PLO from independently implementing international obligations in the territory and
with regard to the population of Palestine. Under the terms of the DOP
and the subsequent agreements concluded pursuant to it, Israel maintains authority over most aspects of the PA's external relations; the
PLO is empowered to represent it only in international negotiations regarding economic, social, and technical development. It cannot regulate
the flow of goods and persons into and out of Palestinian territory; it
cannot facilitate the establishment of diplomatic missions from foreign
countries in its territory; and it cannot translate international commitments affecting the territory or population of Palestine into PA policies
without first obtaining Israel's consent. Thus, while the PLO engages
in international relations, its activities are one step removed from the
territory and population of Palestine.3 43 Under these circumstances,
Palestine, as a national and territorial unit, does not have the capacity
to engage independently in international relations.
e. Independence
A requirement generally appended to -

and implicit in 344 -

the

339. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 47.
340. Liechtenstein is a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a
privilege reserved to states. U.N. Charter, art. 93. DUGARD, supra note 290, at 77.
341. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 190 (quoting Note of June 18, 1973: SCOR 29th yr.,
Sp. Supp. No. 2, 120).
342. Id. at 47.
343. See McKinney, supra note 319, at 112-13; James L. Prince, The InternationalLegal Implications of the November 1988 PalestinianDeclarationof Statehood, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 681, 696 (1989).
344. Wallace-Bruce suggests that the independence requirement is implicit in the capacity to enter into foreign relations. WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 281, at 57. See also
CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 47 ("[Elach State is an original foundation predicated on a
certain basic independence. This was represented in the Montevideo formula by 'capacity
to enter into relations with other States."').
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Montevideo criteria is independence.345 Indeed, some international jurists see independence as the central criterion for statehood, all other
requirements subordinate to and emerging from it.346 The classic formulation of the independence criterion appears in Judge Anzilotti's
opinion in the Austro-German Customs Union Case:
[T]he independence of Austria within the meaning of Article 88 is
nothing else but the existence of Austria, within the frontiers laid down
by the Treaty of Saint Germain, as a separate state not subject to the
authority of any other State or group of States. Independence as thus
understood is really no more than the normal condition of States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty
(supremapotestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that34 7the
State has over it no authority other than that of international law.
Independence in this context means, therefore, that a State must
be separate and sovereign, that is, that it possess a legal order that is
both distinct from another State's and subordinate only to international
law.

3 48

The separateness requirement is logically grounded in the very
concept of international law. As Marek explains, independence is a criterion for statehood because "international law, above all, is a legal order governing relations between independent States, that is to say, between separate and distinct entities. No international law would be
either possible or necessary, without a clear delimitation of its subjects,
which together form the international community."3 49 The existence of
an international community, therefore, presupposes the existence of defined individual members. It is perhaps in vindication of this principle
that international law requires that a putative State govern a defined
territory and population. Definition, after all, presupposes differentiation.
The independence requirement is not, however, satisfied by separateness alone. The additional element of sovereignty ensures that a
State has the legal capacity to effect the commitments into which it has
entered on behalf of its population and territory. As Judge Huber
stated in the Island of Palmas Case: "[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
other state, the functions of a state." 350 Sovereignty, therefore, is
framed in exclusive terms. An independent State, in the international
context, cannot be subordinate to another State's legal order.

345. See generally MAREK, supranote 295, at 162-68.
346. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 48 (citing a number of international legal scholars)
(emphasis added).
347. 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), at 57 (Anzilotti, J., concurring).
348. See CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 51-52.
349. MAREK, supra note 295, at 162-63.
350. CRAWFORD, supra note 8, at 48 (quoting Island of Palmas Arbitration, 2 R.I.A.A.
829, 838 (1928) (Huber, J.)).
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Palestine arguably fulfills the requirement of separateness, but not
of sovereignty. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are territorially distinct
3 51
from the State of Israel and are governed by a separate legal order.
Palestinian residents of the OPT are not represented in the Israeli Government, they are subject to separate laws and a separate judicial system, and they may not claim the legal rights guaranteed to residents of
Israel. The international community, moreover, has consistently regarded the OPT as legally separate from Israel and has decried Israel's
attempts to impose its legal order on the Territories.
As discussed at length in Section II(C), however, the PA has established, at best, only limited sovereignty over the territories under its
administration. Israel continues to exercise many state functions in the
OPT, including the maintenance of overriding control over the Territories' infrastructure, borders, and security; and it is empowered by the
agreements concluded pursuant to the DOP to veto any of the PA's legislative enactments that it deems objectionable. In view of these arrangements, it would be difficult to characterize the PA as an independent entity. While the PLO's independence is not compromised by
the DOP and subsequent agreements, the PLO does not, itself, possess
legal authority over the OPT; under the DOP, that authority resides in
the PA and in Israel. Thus, the government of the population and territory of Palestine, the PA, lacks the independence necessary to consolidate Palestine's legal status as a State.
3. The Constitutive Approach
In order for an entity's statehood to be "constituted" by recognition,
it must first be recognized to be a State. The establishment of the PA
has not, however, brought about international recognition of Palestinian statehood. Indeed, while the United Nations General Assembly and
several individual States have expressed the hope that the current
peace process will culminate in the establishment of a State of Palestine, no State or international body has recognized the PA as an independent State, and the PLO has not urged such recognition. Palestine
consequently is no more a State under the constitutive approach than
under the declaratory approach.
4. Transitional Association
As presently constituted, Palestine does not fit easily into defined

351. The recent agreements between the PLO and Israel affirm the legal and territorial distinctness of the OPT. See, e.g., Interim Agreement, ch. 2, art. 11, para. 1, 36 I.L.M.
551 (stating that both sides regard the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "a single territorial
unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period"). Although Israeli citizens residing in the OPT may claim the protection of Israeli law, those
rights flow from their Israeli citizenship, not from their residence in the OPT. In much
the same way, the United States Constitution protects American citizens abroad from invasions of their rights by the U.S. Government. See generally, Gerald L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
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categories of international status. Under the interim arrangements established by the DOP, Palestine may best be described as a transitional
association between the PA and the PLO. The PLO, which has been
recognized to possess an independent international personality as representative of the Palestinian people, has been delegated the power to
act on behalf of the PA in the international arena with regard to specific
substantive areas. Nevertheless, the PA's constituent organs (the
President and Legislative Council) are elected by and serve the interests of the population of the OPT. They form a local government with
largely municipal functions and, with regard to those functions, they
are independent of the PLO. In this limited respect, the relationship
between the two public bodies approximates an association between
states.
That noted, however, several factors distinguish the PA-PLO relationship from the traditional legal status of association. Foremost, of
course, neither entity is a State. While each, as seen above, possesses
certain attributes of statehood, neither meets the objective or subjective
criteria requisite for that status. Moreover, the powers withheld from
the PLO by the DOP - i.e. the authority to conclude international
agreements (with parties other than Israel) that affect the status or security of the OPT - are held by Israel, not by the PA. The PA is consequently in a position of subordination to both the PLO and Israel. Further, the current arrangements have elicited the support of the
Palestinian population only insofar as they are transitional. The terms
of the DOP, as approved by the PNC, characterize the PA as an interim
measure pending the conclusion of permanent status negotiations. The
idiosyncratic association between the PA, the PLO, and Israel therefore
cannot be seen as an exercise of the free choice of the Palestinian people, who cannot alter the international status of their territory at will.
The relationship between the existing Palestinian public bodies
does, however, have an important function with regard to the exercise
of Palestinian self-determination. As discussed in Section III(A), above,
international law requires heightened scrutiny of changes to a territory's status while it is under belligerent occupation in order to ensure
that the changes meet the approval of the territory's population.
Agreements concluded between the authorities of an occupied territory
and the Occupying Power are especially suspect, raising concerns about
the authorities' capacity for independent action. Although the potential
for coercion in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians remains great so long as the OPT remain under Israeli occupation, the
relationship between the PLO and the PA helps to preserve Palestinian
negotiators' independence from Israel and to avoid the presumption
that the PA is merely a puppet of the Government of Israel. Perhaps
ironically, the separation between the two public bodies serves these interests as much as the connections between them. While the fact that
the PLO sanctioned and negotiated the transitional arrangements pro-
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vides them with international legitimacy,35 2 its legal and functional
separation from the PA ensures that the entity conducting permanent
status negotiations with Israel is not subordinate to Israeli authority.
Since independence is a prerequisite for freedom, the continuing independence of the international representative of the Palestinian people is
essential to the free exercise of Palestinian self-determination.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the words of the Syrian poet Adonis, Palestine remains "stalled
between seasons." The international community has afforded universal
recognition to the Palestinians' peoplehood, and most States support
their right to self-determination in the territory defined in the 1988
Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Moreover, all States recognize the special status of the PLO as international representative of the
Palestinian people. Through the establishment of the PA, the PLO now
has the opportunity to translate its efforts on the international front
into more concrete benefits for the Palestinian population in the OPT.
The creation of the PA has not, however, altered the international
status of the PLO or, more broadly, of Palestine. It does not itself represent a fulfillment of the national aspirations articulated in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence or of the internationally-recognized
legal rights that it invoked. The legal and functional separation of the
PLO and the PA erected by the DOP and subsequent agreements maintains the independence of the PLO, despite Israeli control of the OPT.
It also serves, however, as a barricade against changes in the status of
either public body: it denies the PLO effective authority over the territory it claims for the Palestinians, and it denies the PA independence
and access to the international decision-making process.
The Government of Israel and the PLO have allocated the permanent status of the OPT to the final stage of negotiations within the
framework established by the DOP. The PLO has consistently articulated its commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the OPT and has emphasized the inadequacy of any proposed solutions that fall short of that goal. 353 Although Israel's Labor
Party adopted a platform omitting the once-standard clause rejecting
the establishment of a Palestinian state before Israeli elections last
June, 35 4 the Likud government of Benjamin Netanyahu has stated unequivocally that it opposes Palestinian statehood. 355 While a majority of

352. See infra Section II(C)(1).
353. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state remains the PLO's chief
negotiating goal, according to the Organization's Chief Representative in the United
States. Interview with Khalil A. Foutah, supranote 259; see also Advisor to Yasser Arafat
Rejects Puerto-Rico-like Palestine, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 9, 1996, available in
1996 WL 12177831.
354. See Stephen McFarland, Foes Soften on Palestine: Israel Party Platform Vote,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Apr. 26, 1996, at 2.
355. Government Guidelines for the Israeli Government Elected on 29 May 1996,
JERUSALEM POST,June 18, 1996, at 3.
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the States represented in the U.N. General Assembly regard Palestinian statehood to be a legitimate aspiration, the United States traditionally has opposed the idea, supporting instead association of Palestine
with Jordan. 356 An evaluation of the status most beneficial to the Palestinian people and most likely to ensure the maintenance of long-term
minimum order in the Middle East will require a thorough assessment
of the political conditions and economic relationships in the region, an
undertaking beyond the scope of this essay (and, regrettably, the capacities of its author). It is important to make clear at the outset, however, that the process of evaluating these alternatives should be informed, indeed governed, by certain core legal principles. Perhaps
above all, while the Palestinians' exercise of self-determination may
manifest itself in any one of a number of forms of self-government, international law requires that the outcome ultimately be the freelyexpressed choice of the Palestinian people.

356. See, e.g., Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Sept.1,1982), THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE AGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 253-56.
("In the Middle East context, the term self-determination has been identified exclusively
with the formation of a Palestinian state. We will not support this definition of selfdetermination.") The United States government has not articulated its present official
position on the issue. See, Remarks of Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III at the
Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation Conference, FED. NEWS SERV.,
available in 1996 WL 5796086.

